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Executive summary
OLAF: DETECT, INVESTIGATE, PROTECT
In 2017, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) closed 
large-scale investigations, showing its capacity to 
detect and investigate complex fraud schemes across 
Europe and beyond. 
OLAF investigations ranged from major undervaluation 
fraud cases where fraudsters profited from declaring 
falsely low values for goods at import in the European 
Union (EU), to cases where OLAF tackled organised 
crime groups defrauding funds intended for agriculture, 
or cases where investigators uncovered fraud in large in-
frastructure projects. 
OLAF’S INVESTIGATIVE PERFORMANCE IN 2017:
  OLAF concluded 197 investigations, issuing 309 
recommendations to the relevant national and 
EU authorities. 
  OLAF recommended the recovery of over 
EUR 3 billion to the EU budget. This exceptionally 
high figure stems from major undervaluation fraud 
cases concluded by OLAF during the year.
  OLAF opened 215 new investigations, following 
1111 preliminary analyses carried out by OLAF experts.
  In the absence of any staff increase and despite 
the complexity of the cases it dealt with, OLAF 
succeeded in further reducing the duration of its 
investigations to 17.6 months overall. 
TRENDS IN ANTI-FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:
The transnational dimension of its work allows OLAF 
to form a unique view of the changing nature of fraud 
across Europe. For the second consecutive year, OLAF 
presents in this Report an analysis of some of the most 
striking trends revealed by OLAF investigations:
  Corruption, conflict of interest and the manipulation 
of tender procedures continue to be encountered in 
fraud cases affecting EU structural funds, with some 
instances where organised crime groups try to gain 
profit.
  Fraudsters have increasingly attempted to defraud 
funds destined for research or the refugee crisis.
  The evasion of customs duties is orchestrated 
through transnational criminal schemes. 
OLAF’S UNIQUE ROLE IN FIGHTING REVENUE 
FRAUD THROUGH GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS:
OLAF is presenting in this Report a detailed overview of 
its activities aimed at protecting EU revenue, with the 
conclusion of a string of investigations in this area in 
2017. Any gaps in the legislative setting or operational 
capacity of customs administrations to function across 
borders are quickly exploited by organised criminal 
groups. In this context, due to its ability to operate 
transnationally and to gather and share information, 
OLAF plays a crucial role in preventing and tackling 
revenue fraud, as well as in assisting national customs 
administrations in their challenging work. 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE EU POLICIES  
TO FIGHT FRAUD:
OLAF is at the forefront of negotiating legislative 
texts concerning the protection of the EU’s financial 
interests against fraud and corruption. The decision to 
create a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in 
2017 marked a milestone in the defence of the financial 
interests of the European Union. OLAF has worked 
relentlessly in support of this project for many years, 
and will continue to work alongside the EPPO to ensure 
taxpayers’ money is effectively protected from fraud 
and corruption.
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Foreword
The positive results for OLAF set out in this Report were very largely achieved under 
the leadership of Giovanni Kessler. Mr Kessler served as Director-General from 
February 2011 until October 2017, when shortly before the end of his mandate at 
OLAF he returned to Italy to become Director-General of the Agency for Customs 
and Monopolies. He took with him our appreciation for his contribution to our work 
and all our best wishes for his new appointment.
In October 2017 the Council adopted the Regulation on the establishment of a 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the EPPO Regulation). This marked a decisive 
step in the defence of the financial interests of the European Union, and indeed in 
the development of the European project, by introducing for the first time, albeit 
not in all Member States, a structure for criminal prosecution at EU level. Once the 
EPPO starts operations, at earliest late in 2020, prosecutions in serious cases of 
fraud against the EU budget will increasingly be brought before national criminal 
courts by a European body. 
The creation of the EPPO marks also a milestone in the history of OLAF and of the 
project which started with the creation of its predecessor, UCLAF1, in 1988. UCLAF 
and OLAF staff, past and present, have been working towards this goal for many 
years, in some distinguished instances for a quarter of a century. Their professional 
expertise, insight, creativity and determination to deliver have constituted the 
driving force without which the EPPO would certainly not have got off the ground 
and might never have got onto the agenda. 
A glance at the academic literature shows the extent to which OLAF staff have 
contributed to the intellectual foundations of the EPPO project. A future historian 
might attempt to unravel all the complex interactions from Corpus Juris in the early 
1990s through the successful incorporation of Article 86 in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 
to the conception and negotiation of the necessary legal texts in more recent years. 
He or she would surely highlight the consistent pursuit of this strategic objective 
by successive OLAF senior management, as well as the skilful tactics of individual 
OLAF colleagues at critical points along the path.
It follows that we, in OLAF, are proud of our collective achievement and are 
committed to playing our part in making the EPPO a success. We are now moving to 
the next stage; not only but not least for OLAF, the EPPO is no longer an ambition, 
but has become a challenge. 
The architecture as finally determined by the legislator gives the EPPO and OLAF 
complementary roles. The original concept under which the operational resources 
of OLAF would have been integrated in or placed under the direct control of the 
EPPO did not find favour with the Member States.  OLAF will therefore retain all its 
present responsibilities for investigations in those Member States which do not join 
the EPPO, and for many investigations in the Institutions and the Member States 
which fall outside the EPPO’s mandate or which the EPPO opts not to pursue. 
OLAF will also remain responsible for administrative investigations whose purpose 
is to enable the recovery of money for the EU taxpayer. It will continue to be 
necessary, under the new framework for protecting the financial interests of the EU, 
to find an appropriate balance, often on a case by case basis, between the objectives 
of recovering money and of obtaining convictions in the criminal courts.
1  Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude, unit coordinating the fight against fraud, part 
of the Secretariat General of the European Commission 1988-1999), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/about-us/history_en
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and under OLAF’s own powers and responsibility. The Commission’s legislative 
proposal which is needed to adapt the present OLAF Regulation to be consistent 
with the EPPO Regulation will probably have been adopted by the time this Report 
is published.  It is important that the legislator, in further clarifying the relationship 
between OLAF and the EPPO, leaves sufficient space for operational flexibility and 
for the working relationship to develop over time. This is a necessary condition 
for a successful partnership, but not a sufficient condition.  As always, loyal and 
constructive cooperation between committed public servants, in a spirit of trust 
and respect, will be essential.
A new Director-General will shortly be appointed to guide OLAF through the next 
stage of our journey, in the footsteps of Franz-Hermann Brüner and of Giovanni 
Kessler. As this Report and its predecessors show, the incoming Director-General 
will find OLAF solidly established, on a stable course, with a well-deserved 
reputation for effective and independent investigations in defence of the financial 
interests and reputation of the EU.
Apart from the strategic challenges of adapting OLAF to work with the EPPO, of 
reacting to changes in the threat and of maintaining the commitment of staff in 
the face of increasing workload and at best stable resources, the Director-General 
will face some difficulties which are particular to the environment in which OLAF 
functions. 
These include continuing ambiguities in governance structures; handling the 
complex and sometimes acute tensions which OLAF’s independent investigations 
can provoke in the Member States and in the Institutions; and occasionally con-
fronting some residual naivety among well-intentioned stakeholders and observers, 
even after OLAF has been on the scene for nearly two decades, about the 
seriousness of the threat from fraud and serious misconduct and the need for OLAF 
to be allowed to hold and to exploit proportionate means to address this threat. 
The incoming Director-General will have the privilege of leading the formidable body 
of women and men who constitute OLAF’s staff. Our colleagues come from many 
different national and professional cultures; former police and customs officers, 
former public prosecutors, judges and advocates, auditors and financial specialists, 
former tax inspectors, intelligence analysts and data specialists, forensic IT experts, 
policy and legal officers, specialists in IT systems and development, economists and 
statisticians, communication specialists, and even the occasional diplomat.  
Some have joined OLAF in mid or late career from national services; increasingly, 
others have spent most of their working lives in the European public service and 
have decided to bring their experience and expertise to bear on the fight against 
fraud for a period of time. Together, they make a unique team, and one which is 
very much the model for other international organisations in our line of business. It 
is inspirational to work with them and to see how the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts. On behalf of Giovanni Kessler, myself and the other members of the 
senior management team, I thank OLAF staff for their hard work, their enthusiasm 
and their support. As my own career in the public service draws to an end, I can 
think of no better place from which to say goodbye.
Nicholas Ilett
Acting Director-General, May 2018
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1. Mission and mandate 
MISSION
Detect, investigate and work towards stopping fraud 
involving European Union funds.
MANDATE
OLAF’s mandate is:
  to conduct independent investigations into fraud 
and corruption involving EU funds so as to ensure 
that EU taxpayers’ money reaches projects that can 
stimulate the creation of jobs and growth in Europe;
  to investigate serious misconduct by EU staff and 
members of the EU institutions, thus contributing to 
strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU institutions;
  to develop EU policies to counter fraud.
COMPETENCES
OLAF can investigate matters relating to fraud, 
corruption and other offences affecting EU financial 
interests concerning: 
  all EU expenditure: the main spending categories 
are Structural Funds, agricultural policy and rural 
development funds, direct expenditure and external 
aid;
  some areas of EU revenue, mainly customs duties.
OLAF can also carry out investigations into suspicions 
of serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the 
EU institutions.
OLAF is part of the European Commission and, as such, 
under the responsibility of Commissioner Günther H. 
Oettinger (Budget and Human Ressources). 
However, in its investigative mandate, OLAF acts in full 
independence. 
WHAT WE DO 
 OLAF’s investigative work broadly involves:
  assessing  incoming information of potential 
investigative interest to determine whether 
there are sufficient grounds for OLAF to open an 
investigation;
  conducting administrative anti-fraud investigations, 
where appropriate, in cooperation with national 
criminal or administrative investigative authorities 
and with EU and international bodies;
  supporting the anti-fraud investigations of national 
authorities;
  recommending actions that should be taken by the 
relevant EU or national authorities;
  monitoring the actions taken by these authorities, 
in order to assess the impact of OLAF’s work in the 
fight against fraud and better tailor the support 
OLAF provides to national authorities.
10
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Responsibilities for much of EU spending are shared 
between European, national, regional and local levels. 
Even where EU institutions manage funds directly, 
the money is often spent across national borders, and 
sometimes outside the EU. The detection, investigation 
and prosecution of fraud against the EU budget can 
therefore only be conducted in cooperation with a 
wide range of partners, at national, European and 
international level. 
OLAF cases frequently concern: 
  cross-border procurement fraud or corruption 
in public procurement procedures involving EU 
financing;
  double funding, where, through deceit, a project is 
funded several times by different donors who are 
unaware of the contributions the others made;
  subsidy fraud in different forms, as fraudsters 
take advantage of the difficulties of managing and 
controlling transnational expenditure programmes. 
Examples include the delivery of the same piece 
of research to several funding authorities within 
or beyond EU borders, plagiarism – the copying of 
research, which has already been undertaken by 
others, or the deliberate gross disrespect of the 
conditions of financial assistance;
  customs fraud where fraudsters attempt to avoid 
paying customs duties (EU own resources), for 
instance by smuggling goods into the EU.
EU bodies are, like other employers, at risk of fraud from 
their members and staff in relation to remuneration, 
travel and relocation allowances, social security 
and health entitlements. They may also be at risk of 
corrupt activity by members and staff in procurement 
procedures, and of other forms of corruption such 
as illicit attempts to influence decision-making and 
recruitment procedures. To some degree, these risks are 
enhanced by the transnational nature of EU business. 
OLAF has therefore a unique mandate to carry out 
so-called “internal” investigations into any allegations 
of misconduct involving staff and members of the EU 
institutions.
11
The OLAF report 2017
Figure 1: EU expenditure in 2017
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Global Europe
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Total 
expenditure
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billion
(1) Source: OJ L227, 1.9.2017, p. 3
Disclaimer: these are based on final amounts but are still subject to reliability checks by the European Court of Auditors
Figure 2: EU revenue in 2017
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(1) Source: OJ L227, 1.9.2017, p. 4
Disclaimer: these are based on final amounts but are still subject to reliability checks by the European Court of Auditors
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2. OLAF investigative activity:  
trends in anti-fraud investigations
In recent years, OLAF has focused on tackling complex 
cases, where its unique investigative capacity can bring 
real added value in uncovering fraud and delivering 
tangible results to EU taxpayers. OLAF management 
has supported this investigative drive by making the 
necessary infrastructure investments and by ensuring 
that a maximum number of staff work on investigations. 
For the second consecutive year, in this Report, we focus 
on showcasing the substance of OLAF’s investigative 
work, highlighting the most prominent trends that our 
investigations have revealed. 
Figure 3: OLAF’s investigative activity in 2017: maintaining a steady investigative drive
1 111
Selections completed
309
Recommendations
issued
215
Investigations
opened
197
Investigations 
concluded
EUR 
3.095
billion
Recommended
for financial
recovery
2.1. Summary of OLAF’s  
investigative performance  
in 2017
In brief, the performance indicators displayed above 
show that in 2017 OLAF has continued to perform well, 
in line with the path followed in previous years. OLAF 
opened 215 investigations after a process of analysing 
incoming information in 1111 selections. It concluded 
197 investigations pursuant to which it issued 309 
recommendations to competent authorities at EU and 
national level. As a result of investigations concluded 
during the year, OLAF recommended the recovery of 
over €3 billion to the EU budget. Recovered funds will 
gradually return to the budget and be reattributed to 
projects that can stimulate growth and jobs in Europe. 
In 2017, OLAF has also continued to reduce the duration 
of its investigations, to 17.6 months overall, with 
the selection duration corresponding to these cases 
remaining at around 1.8 months. 
For a detailed presentation of these and other 
performance indicators, please refer to the Annex to 
this Report.
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Figure 4:  Investigations into the use of EU funds managed or spent in whole or in part at national  
or regional level concluded in 2017
Country Cases concluded
Total number per country from which closed with 
recommendations
Romania 11 8
Hungary 10 7
Poland 10 7
Greece 9 5
Bulgaria 7 4
Germany 5 3
Italy 5 4
Czech Republic 4 2
Slovakia 4 2
France 3 2
Portugal 3 2
Serbia 3 3
Croatia 2 2
Haiti 2 0
Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, 
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia, Mali, 
Moldova, Morocco, Niger, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay , Zambia
24 
(1 per country)
7
Total 102 58
As in previous years, we present below a breakdown of 
the investigations concluded by OLAF in 2017, concerning 
the use of EU funds managed or spent in whole or in part 
at national or regional level. This overview presents the 
geographical focus of OLAF’s investigative activity in 
2017. It is worth noting that OLAF’s investigative work 
depends largely on the amount, type and quality of 
information the Office receives. 
Figure 5 shows that, as was the case in previous years, 
the structural funds sector remains at the core of 
OLAF’s investigative activity. 
Figure 5: Ongoing investigations at the end of 2017, divided by sector
Reporting sector 2014 2015 2016 2017
Structural Funds 111 104 69 73
External Aid 79 66 52 58
Centralised Expenditure 49 58 59 71
Customs and Trade 56 50 60 44
EU Staff 43 37 48 64
Agricultural Funds 60 36 21 22
Social Fund 42 21 19 5
Tobacco and Counterfeit goods 21 18 8 7
New Financial Instruments 13 8 8 18
Total 474 398 344 362
14
The OLAF report 2017
2.2. OLAF’s added value:  
central role in complex 
investigations
OLAF has a unique mandate to fight fraud affecting 
European Union finances. It also benefits from a 
noteworthy position since the transnational dimension 
of its work allows it to form a full picture of the changing 
nature of fraud across Europe. In recent years, OLAF 
has strived to focus on fraud cases with the largest 
impact and on complex investigations, where its trans-
European view brings a clear added-value to curbing 
fraud. We present below an analysis of some of the 
most striking trends revealed by OLAF investigations 
in 2017. This analysis is based on empirical evidence, 
without amounting to a complete list of investigations 
concluded by OLAF. However, these trends give an 
indication of the areas most prone to fraud with EU 
funds, as well as of the new ways in which fraudsters try 
to pocket EU money. 
CORRUPTION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
AND MANIPULATION OF TENDER 
PROCEDURES:  
Fraud involving EU structural funds remained at the 
core of OLAF’s investigative work in 2017. While the 
scope of fraud itself has not changed, investigators 
noticed new ways in which fraudsters try to cheat 
the system, circumventing EU rules. One of the main 
common features of the OLAF cases concluded in 2017 
was the collusion between the winner of a tender and 
either a consultant or the beneficiary of the funding. 
Conflict of interest also featured prominently in many 
of OLAF’s cases, sometimes involving political figures 
and large public procurement projects.
Two investigations OLAF conducted into 
projects financed by the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) for road 
constructions in Romania illustrate this trend. OLAF’s 
investigations uncovered that the representatives 
of a county municipality, the beneficiary, had 
colluded with representatives of the company who 
designed the technical specifications for the road, 
in order to establish restrictive criteria in the tender 
documentation that would benefit one particular 
economic operator. This company won the contract, 
while the rest of the tenderers were disqualified 
during the initial evaluation phase. 
The two colluding organisations falsified a large 
number of documents, including the technical project 
and memorandum for the road construction, as well 
as the structure checks. These falsified documents 
were not only used by the municipality in the tender 
procedure related to the works, but were also later 
submitted to support a claim for reimbursement 
from the Managing Authority, resulting in the undue 
allocation of EU funds.
15
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OLAF calculated that the financial damage to 
the European Union budget stemming from these 
cases is approximately EUR 21 million, representing 
the total value of EU funding paid by the Managing 
Authority. As a result, OLAF recommended that the 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
of the European Commission recover the full amount, 
and issued judicial recommendations to the Romanian 
National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) to initiate 
judicial actions.
The DNA responded to OLAF’s recommendations 
by opening a criminal investigation. In November 2017, 
the DNA brought charges against high-level officials in 
Romania for fraud with EU funds, for creating an organ-
ised criminal group and misusing an official position for 
personal gain. In order to secure the recovery of funds 
to the EU budget, the DNA prosecutors seized assets 
and froze the bank accounts of the persons concerned. 
The European Commission asked Romania to carry out 
the necessary corrections so that the EU budget would 
not be affected. Romania agreed to the Commission’s 
request to apply these corrections. 
A similar scenario was uncovered in Hungary 
during an investigation into 35 lighting 
projects implemented under the Hungarian 
Environment and Energy Operational Program and co-
financed by the European Structural and Investment 
Funds. The projects were aimed at updating the 
public lighting infrastructure in various Hungarian 
municipalities using environmentally friendly and 
power-saving LED technology products. 
OLAF verified the grant applications and found 
that the initial cost estimations calculated by the 
applicants were irregular, with artificial supporting 
documents used to justify a cost benefit analysis. 
Moreover, a consulting company linked with the 
main contractor had signed a contract with several 
beneficiaries to draft the technical annex to their 
project application, and could thus influence the 
content of the technical specifications used by the 
beneficiary during the tender procedure. OLAF also 
uncovered numerous serious irregularities that had 
occurred during the public procurement procedures. 
It also identified conflict of interest between some 
consultants and the works company.
Upon concluding its investigation at the end 
of 2017, OLAF sent its final report with financial 
recommendations to the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban 
Policy to recover EUR 43.7 million, and judicial 
recommendations to the General Prosecutor of 
Hungary. 
In a case concluded in 2017, OLAF 
investigated allegations of misuse of funds by 
a cooperative in the Czech Republic, which 
had received funding from the European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund. Among the criteria for recognition 
of a producer organisation and of a supranational 
producer organisation for fruit and vegetables, 
there was a requirement for the applicants to secure 
independent management and operation of the 
organisation. 
The OLAF investigation revealed that most 
members of the cooperative were in fact owned by 
the same family. OLAF concluded that the family 
links among the persons involved in the ownership of 
the cooperative could influence the decisions of the 
cooperative, making it ineligible for EU subsidies as 
both a producer organisation and as a supranational 
producer organisation. OLAF recommended that EUR 
5.5 million in EU funds be excluded. OLAF also issued 
a judicial recommendation to the Supreme Public 
Prosecutor’s Office of the Czech Republic to initiate 
judicial proceedings.
In another investigation concluded in 2017, 
OLAF identified serious irregularities 
affecting a EUR 2 million project related 
to promotional services for improving the image of 
fisheries and aquaculture products in Italy, which was 
co-financed under the European Fisheries Fund. 
On-the-spot-checks at the premises of several 
economic operators, interviews with witnesses and 
persons concerned, as well as coordination meetings 
with the Managing Authority allowed OLAF to confirm 
the existence of serious irregularities and fraud 
affecting the project. In particular, OLAF acquired 
evidence proving that both the awarding procedure 
and the implementation phase of the project were not 
in compliance with public procurement law provisions. 
For example, the starting price of the procurement 
was not fixed by carrying out a required analysis, 
the Managing Authority did not execute appropriate 
controls, and several sub-contracting activities 
were granted in the absence of the necessary 
authorisation of the Managing Authority. Moreover, 
the implemented project was different from what had 
been agreed with the Managing Authority in the initial 
timetable and some deliverables were not operational 
in the agreed timeframe.  
OLAF also identified possible kick-back payments 
among the different subcontractors, which indicated 
the likelihood of criminal offences under the Italian 
criminal code. As a result, OLAF addressed judicial 
recommendations to the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
16
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of Rome, as well as a financial recommendation to 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries to recover the full 
amount of the project.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office of Rome followed up 
on OLAF’s recommendations, together with the Italian 
Carabinieri, by opening a criminal investigation which 
has led to a person being placed under house arrest, as 
well as to seizures amounting to EUR 2.1 million.
Niche markets can be attractive to fraudsters, as they 
are often highly technical and only a limited number of 
companies have the required expertise to make viable 
offers. If the tender procedure is opened to international 
consortia, it can be very difficult for national authorities 
to detect and investigate any irregularity or fraud 
warning signs. In such cases, OLAF can demonstrate its 
added value, as it combines technical expertise with the 
capacity to conduct transnational investigations.
For example, the expertise of OLAF 
investigators in international tender 
procedures allowed them to unravel a 
complex fraud scheme designed to divert EU funds by 
a group of international businessmen. This occurred 
in the context of OLAF investigations into EU-funded 
projects on the development of inland waterways in 
Croatia.
In close cooperation with national authorities, 
OLAF conducted investigative activities in different 
EU Member States. Using forensic technology, 
investigators pieced together a clear picture of cross-
border procurement fraud. OLAF found evidence that 
the conspirators gained access to confidential tender 
information, shared that information and rewrote 
the tender specifications in order to favour the 
winning consortium. As a result of its investigations, 
OLAF recommended that the economic operators 
behind the fraud be excluded from participation in 
future projects funded by the EU. Moreover, judicial 
recommendations were addressed to prosecutors in 
The Netherlands, Austria and Croatia. In addition, 
administrative recommendations were sent to the 
European Commission Directorate-General for 
Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. 
While one cannot speak of a trend per se, OLAF has, 
in recent years, conducted a number of investigations 
related to new financial instruments, for example, 
in the use of EU Structural Funds to finance risk 
capital funds. Risk capital funds may, in turn, invest in 
innovative small and medium-sized enterprises that 
are less likely to receive capital from private investors. 
Any investigation into such matters involves assessing 
the eligibility of a large number of enterprises, some 
operating cross-border, which makes OLAF particularly 
able to take on such cases.
During one such investigation, OLAF received 
allegations about several companies which 
were co-financed from the European Regional 
Development Fund through a risk capital fund in 
Germany. The allegations suggested that the investment 
team of the risk capital fund had favoured companies 
which were not eligible for an investment under the 
rules of the European Structural Funds. OLAF examined 
a third of the total fund portfolio and concluded that the 
risk capital fund, run by the same management before 
and after it was privatised, made irregular investments 
in 44 companies, disregarding the investment criteria. 
For example, companies which were not small or 
medium-sized received funding, as well as enterprises 
in financial difficulties or companies threatened with 
insolvency. This contravened the eligibility criteria set 
for EU funding. 
OLAF’s investigation uncovered irregularities and 
suspected fraud as well as significant deficiencies in 
the control obligations of the national authorities, and 
confirmed serious flaws in the privatisation process 
of the risk capital fund. OLAF issued a financial 
recommendation to the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to 
recover EUR 162.3 million. 
The possible misuse of new financial 
instruments was also the subject of another 
investigation OLAF concluded in 2017. In this 
particular case, OLAF looked into the alleged misuse 
of EU funds and of European Investment Bank (EIB) 
loans by an automobile manufacturer. OLAF established 
that the manufacturer obtained a loan from the EIB to 
develop new engines using a so-called defeat device. 
This device allowed the manufacturer to respect 
emission rules in a testing environment, whilst no 
reduction of emissions took place during normal use of 
the car. OLAF concluded its investigation with a judicial 
recommendation to the German authorities, as well as 
an administrative recommendation to the European 
Investment Bank. 
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EMBEZZELMENT OF RESEARCH FUNDING 
The academic and research fields are also prone to fraud, 
as attested by the significant number of fraud cases 
uncovered by OLAF in the past years. In particular, the 
secondment of researchers has become a lucrative 
business for fraudsters, with individuals, research 
institutes or companies pocketing EU money for 
academic or professional exchanges which never actually 
take place, or projects that never come to fruition.
For example, in 2017, OLAF concluded an 
investigation concerning allegations of fraud 
in the secondment of researchers involving 
two Member States. OLAF identified a number of 
scientists, who were supposed to be seconded from a 
research institute in one Member State, to a company 
based in another Member State, and had not carried 
out their secondments as claimed to the competent 
European Commission services. The project 
beneficiaries had falsified CVs and time sheets, and 
made false declarations in order to secure EU funding 
to which they were not entitled. The total damage to 
the EU financial interests exceeded EUR 800 000. The 
investigation was concluded with both judicial and 
financial recommendations.  
A cross-border investigation OLAF concluded 
in 2017 involved allegations related to the 
potential misuse of EU funds in 31 Research 
and Development projects.  The investigation, 
which took place in Hungary, Latvia and Serbia, 
uncovered a subcontracting scheme used to artificially 
increase project costs and hide the fact that the 
final suppliers were linked companies. Moreover, 
OLAF’s investigation established that two research 
centres had artificially set up regional offices in 
order to be eligible for regional EU-funded projects. 
Declarations in work contracts were found to be 
false. OLAF therefore concluded the investigation 
with a financial recommendation to the European 
Commission to recover EUR 28.3 million and a judicial 
recommendation to the Hungarian judicial authorities.
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Another investigation led to OLAF putting 
an end to an intricate fraud scheme through 
which more than EUR 1.4 million worth of 
European Union funds, meant for emergency response 
hovercraft prototypes, had been misappropriated. 
OLAF uncovered the fraud pattern as part of its 
investigation into alleged irregularities in a Research 
and Innovation project granted to a European 
consortium. The Italian-led consortium, with partners 
in France, Romania and the United Kingdom, was 
tasked with creating two hovercraft prototypes to 
be used as emergency nautical vehicles able to reach 
remote areas in case of environmental accidents. 
During on-the-spot checks performed in Italy by OLAF 
and the Italian Guardia di Finanza, OLAF discovered 
various disassembled components of one hovercraft, 
as well as another hovercraft which was completed 
after the deadline of the project. It also became 
evident that, in order to obtain the EU funds, the 
Italian partners had falsely attested to the existence 
of the required structural and economic conditions to 
carry out the project.
Investigative activities carried out by OLAF in the 
UK revealed that the British partner only existed on 
paper and that the company was in fact created and 
owned by the same Italian partners. To simulate the 
actual development of the project and to divert funds, 
fictitious costs had also been recorded. In practice, 
once the EU funds were obtained, the Italian grantees 
used accounting artifices to syphon off money, forging 
documents attesting false expenses.
A thorough analysis of more than 12 000 financial 
transactions and payments made in the project 
showed that part of the EU funds received by the 
Italian and UK partners had been used to pay off 
a mortgage on a castle facing foreclosure. OLAF 
concluded its investigation in 2017 with two judicial 
recommendations - to the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
of Genoa and to the City of London Police in the UK 
– and a financial recommendation to the Directorate-
General for Research and Innovation of the European 
Commission to recover the defrauded funds. The 
Italian authorities are already following up on OLAF’s 
recommendations and investigating the persons 
concerned for embezzlement and fraud against the 
EU, false accounting, fraudulent bankruptcy and 
fraudulent statements. (See Figure 6)
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Figure 6: Operation Paper Castle
OLAF and 
Guardia di Finanza 
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scam with EU funds:
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OLAF put an end to an intricate fraud scheme 
through which more than € 1.4 million had been 
misappropriated.
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place across several 
EU Member States.
In Italy, OLAF relied 
on its close 
cooperation with 
Guardia di Finanza.
Case Details
An Italian-led 
consortium, from 
France, Romania 
and the UK 
received EU 
funds for two 
hovercraft 
prototypes.
The company was 
owned by the 
Italian partner.
Investigators analysed more 
than 12,000 financial 
transactions and payments 
made in the project.
A mortgage on a castle 
facing foreclosure had 
been repaid with the 
EU funds.
The project leader is facing 
charges of embezzlement and 
fraud against the EU.
Close and constant 
cooperation between OLAF 
and Guardia di Finanza was 
central to cracking the case.
The hovercraft were 
meant to reach remote 
areas in case of 
environmental accidents.
The Italian grantees used 
accounting artifices to 
syphon oﬀ money, 
claiming false expenses.
Investigations also 
revealed the UK partner 
only existed on paper. 
Investigators also only 
discovered various disassembled 
components of one hovercraft. 
The other was 
completed after 
the project 
deadline.
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ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS  
ATTEMPTING TO DEFRAUD EU FUNDS
The next chapter of this Report will give details of how 
highly organised criminal gangs attempt to defraud 
the European Union by underdeclaring the value of 
products at import. However, customs is not the only 
field where organised crime groups try to outsmart 
enforcers. Over the years, OLAF has come across mafia 
involvement, for example, in several cases involving 
Agricultural Funds. 
OLAF established contacts with national 
police authorities and Public Prosecutors’ 
Offices and it cooperated with the Italian 
Anti-Mafia Directorate in order to address the issue 
of possible involvement of organised crime in the 
agricultural sector. OLAF closely monitored Italian 
cases where the involvement of organised crime was 
likely, including criminal files concerning EU funding 
awarded to farmers based in the South of Italy with 
possible links to mafia organisations.
At the end of 2017, OLAF concluded an 
investigation into suspected fraud affecting a number 
of aid applications in Italy. OLAF uncovered that 
some Agricultural Assistance Centres had introduced 
a number of “false farmers” in the database of the 
competent national paying agency, thus allowing 
ineligible applicants to receive EU subsidies. 
OLAF’s investigation, as well as a parallel Italian 
national inquiry codenamed Bonifica, revealed 
an articulated fraud pattern. Fraudsters made 
applications for EU subsidies based on declarations 
of ownership of public lands which were ineligible, 
or where supporting documents included false lease 
contracts, as the tenants had either died or were 
not aware of the lease. Similarly, applications were 
presented by individuals subjected to precautionary 
anti-mafia measures under Italian law, hence ineligible 
for funding, or were submitted for land which was 
ineligible because it was under seizure following 
organised crime offences.
OLAF’s investigation was concluded with 
a financial recommendation to the European 
Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and 
Rural Development to recover approximately EUR 30 
million, and with an administrative recommendation 
to the same Directorate-General to ensure that the 
Italian Paying Agency (AGEA) addresses weaknesses 
in its management, control and sanction system with 
relation to payments made to Agricultural Assistance 
Centres. (See Figure 7)
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THE REFUGEE CRISIS:  
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FRAUD?
The conflicts in Syria, as well as in many other parts 
of the world, have created an overwhelming and 
enduring humanitarian crisis1. Millions of people are 
in need of emergency assistance such as medical and 
food aid, water and shelter. The continuous flow of 
1  http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/
syria_en.pdf
refugees seeking safety in the neighbouring countries 
is bringing these states to a saturation point, so it is 
more important than ever for these countries, and the 
refugees they host, to receive the help they need.
The EU is a leading donor in the international response 
to the crisis. Over EUR 10 billion have been mobilised 
for relief and recovery assistance to Syrians, both in 
their home country, and to refugees and their host 
communities in neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, 
Turkey and Egypt. Very substantial amounts are also 
dispensed in other parts of the world.
Figure 7: Organised crime defrauding agriculture funds 
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Humanitarian funding from the EU is frequently 
channelled through international organisations and 
through NGOs, the work of which saves lives, alleviates 
suffering and maintains human dignity. 
Unfortunately, as attested by several OLAF investigations, 
those funds have also attracted the interest of persons 
and groups who are able to exploit humanitarian aid 
and defraud funds. This is largely due to projects 
being developed in difficult operating environments, 
with limited state authority and high corruption risks. 
Moreover, aid is frequently given through local partners, 
whose records can be difficult to check, and is provided 
in conditions of emergency, with less opportunity for 
thorough ex-ante controls.
In this framework, OLAF’s investigations should allow 
not only for the recovery of any possible funds unduly 
disbursed, but should also help the organisations 
affected by fraud to improve their control systems, 
better manage risks and prevent new instances of 
irregularities from taking place. 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL SCHEMES 
DESIGNED TO EVADE CUSTOMS DUTIES 
There was no shortage of transnational criminal 
schemes in the customs area among the cases OLAF 
concluded in 2017. The highest-value investigations 
involved undervaluation fraud – a fraud pattern by 
which international organised crime groups derive 
profit from evading customs and VAT duties by declaring 
falsely low values on imported products. However, 
this was not the only type of fraud scheme identified 
by OLAF. Misdeclaring the country of origin to evade 
anti-dumping duties in high value goods, such as solar 
panels, was also identified as a prevalent fraud trend, as 
was transit fraud, and the smuggling of counterfeit fast-
moving consumer goods. These trends are explained in 
detail in the next chapter. 
2.3. OLAF’s investigative mandate 
within the EU Institutions
OLAF has a unique mandate to carry out internal 
investigations into the EU Institutions, Bodies, Offices 
and Agencies for the purpose of fighting fraud, 
corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the 
financial interests of the Union. The Office investigates 
serious matters relating to the discharge of professional 
duties constituting a dereliction of the obligations of 
EU officials liable to result in disciplinary or, as the case 
may be, criminal proceedings, or an equivalent failure 
to discharge obligations on the part of Members of 
Institutions and bodies. Indeed any perceived lack of 
integrity within the Institutions presents a reputational 
risk not only to the Institutions themselves, but also to 
the European project as a whole.
OLAF’s remit for internal investigations is focused 
on alleged serious wrongdoing. While there is no 
all-encompassing definition of serious wrongdoing, 
OLAF’s resources are concentrated on cases where the 
deployment of OLAF’s skills and powers is warranted. 
Such internal investigations are rare in relative terms 
since there are effective checks and balances in place 
to avoid fraud and misconduct in the EU Institutions. 
OLAF also works with the EU Institutions and bodies 
to help them detect, prevent and address any such 
possible cases.
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The fact that OLAF opens an investigation does not 
mean that someone is guilty. OLAF is required by law 
to investigate both incriminatory and exculpatory 
information. Sometimes a high-quality investigation 
results in the exoneration of the person concerned, 
which is a good result in itself. 
In 2017, as in the previous year, OLAF has continued to 
deal with a relatively high number of cases related to the 
European Parliament. While many of the investigations 
are currently on-going, in 2017 cases typically related to 
the misuse of European Parliament funding to support 
the activities of national parties. Further examples of 
OLAF’s internal investigations are presented below.
OLAF investigated suspicions of false 
declarations by a probationary official who 
intended to obtain the expatriation allowance 
unduly. The allowance, equal to 16% of the basic salary, 
is paid to officials who are not nationals of the State 
where they are employed – Belgium in this case, and who 
during the five years before entering the service did not 
habitually reside or carry their main occupation within 
that State. OLAF found that the probationary official 
had made false declarations. Thanks to the cooperation 
of the Belgian authorities, OLAF obtained information 
about the residence registration history of the official, 
as well about the fact that the official had submitted tax 
declarations to the Belgian authorities prior to his entry 
in the EU Institutions. OLAF’s findings were transmitted 
to the Institution for disciplinary and financial follow up, 
as well as to the Belgian authorities for possible breaches 
of the Belgian criminal and tax code.  
During a similar investigation, OLAF was 
informed by an EU Institution that some of 
its members might have abused the rules on 
reimbursement of travel expenses and claimed higher 
amounts than the costs actually incurred by them 
for their business trips by air. Supporting documents 
attached to reimbursement claims submitted by these 
members, such as flight itineraries, invoices, or price 
confirmation letters, raised doubts as to the reality of 
plane ticket prices declared.  
OLAF conducted on-the-spot checks in the travel 
agencies which had provided the members with the 
ticket reservations and with supporting documents for 
their trips. OLAF also verified the relevant plane ticket 
prices with an airline which operated most of the flights. 
The investigation uncovered that the amounts 
claimed by the members as travel expenses included, 
apart from the plane ticket prices, the costs of 
other services purchased by the members, such as 
accommodation for themselves and/or for another 
person and/or transport expenses for another person. 
The expenses were also sometimes found to include a 
high travel agency commission. The investigation also 
established that the travel agencies which provided the 
members with plane ticket reservations and supporting 
documents for their trips might have acted to cover the 
inflated reimbursement claims of the members. 
OLAF recommended the recovery of more than 
EUR 40 000. No disciplinary recommendation was 
issued due to the lack of relevant rules of conduct for 
the members of this institution. Therefore, OLAF issued 
an administrative recommendation to this institution 
to adopt a code or rules governing the conduct of its 
members, as well as procedures providing for sanctions 
in cases of breaches of such rules. In addition, OLAF 
issued judicial recommendations to the relevant national 
judicial authorities. 
During the course of 2017, OLAF conducted several 
investigations into European Agencies as well as EU 
missions to third countries. 
In one such case, OLAF uncovered that 
two staff members of a European Agency 
had committed serious irregularities 
concerning undeclared external activities and irregular 
conduct. One staff member owned and managed 
several private companies without prior permission 
from the Agency, during office hours and while on 
sick leave, dedicating a significant amount of working 
time to this task. The same staff member did not 
declare a possible situation of conflict of interest when 
participating in the Evaluation Committees of two 
tenders in the Agency. Finally, this person accepted 
material benefits, including a three-day trip to a luxury 
location in another country. This person also provided 
the account manager of the external company with 
internal Agency information and amended the Agency’s 
internal documents in the company’s interests. 
OLAF established that a second staff member had also 
participated in the same undeclared event, without 
requesting permission. 
OLAF sent its final report to the Agency, 
recommending disciplinary actions against both staff 
members and a review of certain internal controls at 
the Agency. OLAF also recommended that judicial 
proceedings be initiated in relation to one of the 
persons concerned by the OLAF investigation. Judicial 
proceedings are under way.
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Figure 8: Investigations into EU staff and members of the Institutions concluded in 2017
Institution, Body, Office, Agency
Cases concluded
Total number of which, concluded with 
recommendations
European Commission 5 3
Agencies 4 3
European Parliament 4 3
Council of the EU 1 1
EULEX 1 1
Committee of the Regions 1 1
European External Action Service 1 0
Total 17 12
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3. Focus chapter: OLAF’s unique role  
in fighting revenue fraud through  
global investigations
In a fast-changing world, where trade is becoming 
increasingly liberalised and markets interconnected, 
European customs officers are under constant pressure. 
Once the protectors of borders, they are now also 
tasked with collecting tax and with important security 
duties. In addition, they have to safeguard citizens 
from purchasing counterfeit, low-quality goods. At 
the same time, there is an increased push for the 
removal of barriers and the creation of a seamless flow 
of goods and capital. Customs officers are therefore 
expected to serve business but also people, to be fast 
and efficient, but also thorough. Moreover, customs 
administrators are now operating in an environment 
where fraudsters are organised, methodical and have 
ample resources. Any gaps in the legislative setting 
or their operational capacity are quickly exploited by 
organised criminal groups. In this context, due to its 
unique ability to operate transnationally and to gather 
and share information, OLAF has a crucial role to play 
in preventing and tackling fraud affecting the revenue 
of the EU, as well as in assisting national customs 
administrations in their important work.
In this year’s Report, OLAF is presenting a Focus 
Chapter with an in-depth overview of its recent 
activities in fighting revenue fraud. While most of 
OLAF’s investigative resources are focused on the 
expenditure side of the budget, in this special chapter, 
we present a detailed picture of OLAF’s activities aimed 
at protecting EU revenue.
26
The OLAF report 2017
3.1. Detecting and investigating 
revenue fraud: OLAF  
at the centre of large-scale 
investigations into  
the undervaluation of goods 
imported into the EU 
In order to facilitate trade, there are several EU customs 
procedures that allow importers to clear their goods at the 
customs point of their choice, rather than at the point of 
entry into the customs territory. Unfortunately, fraudsters 
are good at identifying those administrations where they 
perceive the controls to be more lax. Organised criminal 
networks target these weaker links and fraudulently 
bring goods in the EU through these points. In 2017, 
OLAF concluded a string of large-scale investigations 
into the undervaluation of textiles and footwear entering 
the European Union, generally through Germany, but 
going through customs clearance in the United Kingdom, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, France and Malta.
The fraudsters’ modus operandi was fairly 
simple. Goods from China would arrive in 
containers on vessels, which would generally 
enter Europe through the port of Hamburg, although 
other European ports were used occasionally. The 
containers, considered to be in transit, would then 
be placed on lorries and taken for customs clearance 
elsewhere in the EU, wherever fraudsters considered 
they could get away with declaring falsely low values 
for the products they were importing. 
To understand the phenomenon, OLAF carried 
out an extensive analysis of all customs declarations 
for all imports of textiles and shoes from China 
between 2013 and 2016. A “cleaned average price” 
was calculated for each category of textiles and 
shoes imported from China, based on the value of 
all import declarations in the EU between 2013 and 
2016. A conservative 50% of that value was taken as 
the lowest acceptable price for import declarations 
into the EU, and all declarations below the lowest 
acceptable price were considered as undervalued, 
knowing that a legitimate trade in that context would 
hardly be economically viable. 
In the case concerning goods cleared in the UK2  
– the largest in this string of cases - OLAF calculated 
a loss to the EU budget of almost EUR 1.9 billion in 
customs duties. OLAF recommended this sum for 
recovery to the EU budget. The investigation also 
revealed a substantial VAT evasion, estimated at 
2  See also OLAF Report 2016, p.13 and p.19.
approximately EUR 3.2 billion for the period between 
2013 and 2016. This was related to the abuse of 
customs procedure 42, a mechanism an EU importer 
can use in order to obtain a VAT exemption when 
goods imported from outside the EU into one Member 
State will be transported to another Member State. In 
such cases, the VAT is due in the latter Member State. 
However, in this case, traders “disappeared” and VAT 
was never paid. As the goods were largely destined 
for the markets of other countries, the revenues of 
Member States such as Spain, Germany and Italy were 
mainly affected by the loss. 
In addition to the UK case, OLAF estimated that 
the cumulative loss to the EU budget in customs 
duties stemming from its investigations regarding 
undervaluation in the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, France and Malta was in excess of EUR 300 
million.
The large difference in the amounts recommended 
for recovery is due to the fact that the UK attracted 
far more of the fraudulent traffic in textiles and 
footwear than any other Member State, and 
increasingly so over time. The share of undervalued 
imports through the UK, when compared to legitimate 
trade, steadily rose from 32% in 2013 to 40% in 2014, 
44% in 2015 and 50% in 2016. 
OLAF’s investigation also uncovered a direct 
correlation between diminishing traffic in the fraud 
hubs in the other Member States where authorities 
took action, and the increase of the fraudulent traffic 
through the hub in the UK. By implementing risk 
profiles, which prompt customs officers to take action 
to deal with the risk indicated, such as to physically 
examine a container or to check the customs 
declaration and accompanying documents, the cases 
of undervaluation fraud quickly started to diminish 
in the Czech Republic, Malta and France. Indeed, the 
sooner a Member State took action, the lower the 
revenue losses for the budget. 
Since the UK had not implemented risk profiles, 
fraudsters had, over time, been shifting their 
operations to the UK. This happened despite OLAF 
having repeatedly alerted the UK authorities to the 
need to take action and to investigate the fraud 
networks active in the UK. 
In addition to financial recommendations 
addressed to the European Commission Directorate-
General for Budget, to recover roughly EUR 2.3 billion 
as a result of this string of OLAF investigations, OLAF 
also issued administrative recommendations to the 
Directorate-General for Taxation of the European 
Commission. 
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OLAF’s investigations into undervaluation underlined 
two important facts. One is that any loopholes, such 
as the ease with which customs procedures can be 
misused, will be exploited by fraudsters. The other is 
that quantity fraud, as opposed to quality fraud, pays 
off. Criminals do not need to engage in customs fraud 
with goods that are very expensive. The evasion of 
taxes on cheap products, in extremely large quantities, 
yields the same, if not bigger profits.
Figure 9:  Undervaluation fraud trends (textiles and footwear) 
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3.2. Tackling transit fraud
Transit procedures are abused not only in “missing 
trader” schemes, like the one presented in the previous 
section, but also through the remote hacking of national 
IT transit systems or the bribing of customs officers. 
As OLAF has witnessed in a number of investigations 
involving cigarettes, the goods are loaded onto lorries 
or containers and declared as transiting through the 
European Union. However, the lorries remain in the EU, 
while corrupted customs officers illegally discharge the 
documents accompanying the goods. In another typical 
fraud scheme often involving tobacco smuggling, 
the container, or the lorry, declared as loaded with 
cigarettes leaves EU territory, but the cigarettes are no 
longer inside. In this case, the cigarettes are unlawfully 
discharged before they reach the point of exit from the 
EU, sometimes also with the help of corrupt officials. 
 During one particular investigation, OLAF checked 110 transit operations reported by the National Customs Agency in Bulgaria, 
which established that the operations had been 
unduly cleared. The transit operations were initiated 
in various Member States, such as Poland, Hungary, 
Germany, France, Lithuania and Slovakia. For all of 
these operations, two Bulgarian customs border 
offices were mentioned as office of destination with 
final consignees in Serbia and Turkey. 
However, by inspecting the Bulgarian customs 
offices where the transit operations should have been 
processed, it was established that neither the vehicles 
nor the goods had ever been physically presented to 
customs. Further checks revealed that, in some of 
the cases, the fraudulent electronic clearance of the 
operations took place a few hours after the operations 
had been initiated, which was physically impossible 
due to the timeframe needed for the actual transport. 
In addition, Bulgarian customs were informed by 
both their Serbian and Turkish colleagues that the 
transports concerned never physically entered the 
territory of those two countries. The fraudulent 
clearance of the operations was carried out by means 
of malware which made it possible to hack into the 
Bulgarian transit system remotely. 
3.3. Putting an end to the evasion  
of anti-dumping duties  
on solar panels
Another profitable area of customs fraud is the evasion 
of anti-dumping duties. In the course of 2017, OLAF 
concluded nine investigations into the irregular import 
of solar panels from China into the EU, where most of 
the products were customs-cleared in the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands. Seven of these cases were closed 
with financial recommendations to the Member States 
concerned totalling over EUR 228 million. 
 OLAF investigated a major case involving the evasion of anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed on solar panels originating 
in, or consigned from, the People’s Republic of China. 
It was alleged that solar panels were incorrectly 
declared on importation into the European Union 
as being of Taiwanese origin. In the framework 
of this investigation, OLAF, in cooperation with 
representatives of the Dutch and French customs 
agencies, and the competent Taiwanese authorities, 
carried out joint enquiries in Taiwan. Further checks 
took place in Antwerp, in cooperation with Belgian 
customs. 
OLAF collected and analysed transhipment data, 
EU import data, as well as other documents, while 
also conducting five company visits of Taiwanese 
exporters/consignors, and visits to eleven shipping 
agents in Belgium and Taiwan. It was revealed that 
approximately 2500 container loads of Chinese solar 
panels had been transhipped via Taiwan to the EU. 
OLAF discovered that these consignments of solar 
panels imported into the European Union were not 
actually of Taiwanese origin, as declared. The solar 
panels were shipped from solar panel producers in 
the People’s Republic of China to the Free Zone in 
Taiwan, where the solar panels were loaded into other 
containers and shipped to the EU with new documents 
claiming Taiwanese origin. As the goods came from 
the People’s Republic of China, anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties should have applied. As a result, 
OLAF issued a financial recommendation amounting 
to EUR 135 million.
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Figure 10: Solar panel fraud
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OLAF investigates the evasion of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties on solar panels
OLAF conducts 5 company visits to Taiwanese exporters/consignors 
and 11 visits to shipping agents in Belgium and Taiwan.
The solar panels were shipped from China to the Free Zone in Taiwan, where they 
were loaded into other containers and shipped to the EU claiming Taiwanese origin.
As the goods came from China, and not Taiwan, anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties should have applied. 
Investigations reveal that approximately 2500 container-loads of Chinese solar 
panels were transhipped via Taiwan to the EU. 
OLAF issued a financial recommendation amounting to EUR 135 million.
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3.4. OLAF at the helm of  
trans-European  
Joint Customs Operations
In addition to its investigations concerning cases of 
revenue fraud, OLAF coordinates large-scale Joint 
Customs Operations (JCOs) involving EU and interna-
tional operational partners. JCOs are targeted actions 
of limited duration that aim to combat fraud and the 
smuggling of sensitive goods in specific areas at risk 
and/or on identified trade routes. In 2017, OLAF co-
orga nised or provided support in 11 Joint Customs 
Operations. The Virtual Operations Coordination Unit 
(VOCU) module of the Anti-Fraud Information System 
(AFIS) was used for the secure exchange of information 
in all of these JCOs. 
JCO Renegade was organised within the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) framework, as part of its joint efforts 
in the fight against counterfeit goods. Coordinated by 
OLAF, the operation targeted the international trade of 
counterfeit auto spare parts arriving by sea container. 
All EU Member States, Norway, 12 Asian countries3, 
Interpol, Europol and the Regional Intelligence Liaison 
Office for Western Europe of the World Customs 
Organization participated in the operation. A number 
of vehicle manufacturers also provided a valuable 
contribution in targeting the goods covered by the 
operation, which led to several successful seizures. 
The exchange of information in real time allowed the 
experts involved to identify suspicious consignments 
of counterfeit goods within ordinary commercial 
transactions. Under the coordination of OLAF, EU and 
Asian customs authorities carried out targeted physical 
checks on more than 400 containers. Major European 
ports were involved in the operation, which, over 
the course of two weeks, uncovered a wide array of 
counterfeit goods.
The JCO resulted in the seizure of over 70 000 
counterfeit auto spare parts, including grills, oil and 
air filters, and fuel pumps, along with 590 cylinders 
of CFC refrigerant commonly used in air-conditioning. 
These fake items could not only be harmful to the 
environment, but also be dangerous to the safety and 
health of citizens. An additional 400 000 counterfeit 
3  Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Lao, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam.
goods, including chewing gum, toys, perfumes, 
headphones, garden appliances and sunglasses were 
also halted at the EU’s doorstep. Such products can be 
found in many homes and are often staple products in 
the daily lives of citizens. 
Moreover, 56 million cigarettes were confiscated, as 
well as 668 kilograms of cocaine. The cigarette seizures 
alone prevented the loss of EUR 12 million in customs 
duties and taxes.
JCO Magnum II targeted the smuggling of tobacco 
products transported by road into the EU territory 
from third countries such as Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia. This operation, which was coordinated by the 
Estonian Customs Administration and OLAF with the 
involvement of fourteen Member States, Europol and 
FRONTEX, led to the seizure of roughly 20 million 
cigarettes.
JCO Cerberus focused on controlling failures to 
declare cash used for money laundering and possible 
terrorism offences. This operation was coordinated by 
the French Customs Administration and OLAF with the 
involvement of 27 Member States and the support of 
Europol, and resulted in the seizure of EUR 6.4 million 
in cash.
JCO Octopus II was organised by French Customs in 
cooperation with OLAF and targeted revenue fraud. 
The evaluation of the results is still ongoing at the time 
of reporting.
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3.5. OLAF’s fight against smuggling
FAST-MOVING CONSUMER GOODS:
Infringements related to the trade in counterfeit pro-
ducts increased in recent years, generating vast illicit 
profits for fraudsters while causing huge losses of tax 
revenues for Member States and the EU as a whole. 
The black market for fake products harms the European 
economy, damages legitimate business and stifles 
innovation, putting many jobs at risk.
The European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have conducted a study4 on this 
matter, which yielded worrying results. For example, in 
2013, the imports of counterfeit and pirated products 
into the EU amounted to up to 5% of all EU imports, and 
were worth up to EUR 85 billion. The study revealed that 
brands suffering the most from counterfeiting were 
primarily registered in OECD and in EU Member States, 
with the total effect of lost sales due to counterfeiting 
estimated at EUR 9.5 billion. The analysis of the two 
organisations also revealed that China was the top 
producer of counterfeit goods, with India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Vietnam and Turkey identified as 
important producers in distinct sectors. In terms of 
modus operandi, fake goods were found to arrive in 
large quantities in containers, which would be then 
sent further in small parcels by post or courier services. 
Albania, Egypt, Morocco and Ukraine were the four 
transit points employed for redistributing counterfeit 
products into the EU.
The fight against the traffic in counterfeit Fast-
Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG)5 has also become 
an enforcement priority for OLAF. Investigators have 
focussed in particular on stopping fraud involving 
counterfeit household and personal care products that 
may affect the health and safety of consumers or the 
environment. The growing incidents of counterfeit 
FMCG have also led to a demand for strengthening 
the effectiveness of customs actions, the exchange 
4  http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/mapping-the-real-routes-of-
trade-in-fake-goods-9789264278349-en.htm 
5 Fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) are products that are 
sold quickly and at relatively low cost. Examples include non-
durable goods such as packaged foods, beverages, toiletries, 
over-the-counter drugs and many other consumables. In 
contrast, durable goods or major appliances such as kitchen 
appliances are generally replaced over a period of several 
years. (Source: Wikipedia)
of information between customs authorities, as well 
as the cooperation between the latter, the European 
Agencies and the rights-holders.
In this context, in 2017, OLAF carried out investigative 
activities together with the EU Member States concerned, 
which led to the seizure of 65 tonnes of counterfeit 
washing powder and over 50000 litres of counterfeit 
washing gel.
OLAF also organised a conference dedicated to the 
fight against the import of FMCG in the EU, where the 
right-holders, EU customs authorities as well as Europol, 
Eurojust and EUIPO shared information and agreed on 
further steps to curtail the flow of fake products into 
Europe.
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CIGARETTE SMUGGLING  
THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES:
OLAF has a unique investigative mandate to fight 
tobacco smuggling into the EU which causes huge 
revenue losses to the budgets of the EU and of the 
Member States. In complex cross-border cases in 
particular, OLAF can bring significant added value by 
helping coordinate anti-smuggling operations carried 
out by law-enforcement agencies across Europe. OLAF 
works to ensure that evaded duties are recovered, 
criminal smuggling networks are dismantled and 
perpetrators brought to justice. For the past years, 
OLAF has been paying particular attention to vessels 
loaded with significant quantities of cigarettes in the 
port of Bar in Montenegro, which were destined mainly 
for Libya, Egypt, Lebanon and Cyprus. Many times, 
these vessels were found to arrive at their destination 
empty, with the cigarettes most likely diverted into 
the EU contraband market. The cigarettes were either 
illegally directly unloaded on the EU territory or, 
were transferred onto other vessels on the high seas, 
unknown to the customs or coastguard services, and 
then smuggled back into the EU.
For example, during one particular 
investigation, OLAF tracked two vessels 
loaded with five containers of cigarettes in 
Bar and destined for a Lebanese company in Beirut. 
OLAF found that one of the two vessels never arrived 
in Beirut. The Lebanese company, which was declared 
as consignee of the 3950 master cases of cigarettes, 
did exist, but had not ordered the cigarettes. OLAF 
discovered that this vessel, during the trip from 
Montenegro to Lebanon, kept sailing close to the 
Maltese south coast for four days, making frequent 
stops without any commercial reason. According 
to investigators’ experience, this is the typical 
behaviour of a vessel ready to transfer fraudulently 
the cigarettes onto other vessels. The second vessel, 
loaded with 5391 master cases of cigarettes, did arrive 
in Beirut, but only two containers were still loaded 
with cigarettes, while the other three were empty. 
This means that only 2070 master cases arrived 
in Beirut while the other 3321 master cases had 
disappeared. If these cigarettes had been smuggled 
into the EU, the damage to the EU and national 
budgets would amount to EUR 14.5 million in customs, 
excise and VAT duties lost.
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Overall, since the beginning of 2015, eight vessels and 
their relevant cargo of cigarettes loaded in the port 
of Bar have been seized for smuggling in Greece and 
Spain. The cigarettes loaded onto six of these vessels 
were destined for Libya, one for Cyprus and one for 
Lebanon.  In total, almost 350 million cigarettes were 
seized on these vessels, corresponding to nearly EUR 
70 million in customs, excise and VAT duties. OLAF 
is constantly tracking the movements of suspicious 
containers, in cooperation with the competent services 
of the Member States and third countries, as well as 
with international organisations, to avoid the diversion 
of cigarettes onto the EU contraband market. 
OLAF has also noticed an increase in cigarette smuggling 
by air, either as cargo or transported by passengers.
In July 2017, for example, OLAF provided 
the Spanish Customs with information on 
a suspicious airfreight cigarette shipment 
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), destined for 
Barcelona El Prat Airport. As a result, 1.8 million 
cigarettes were seized. OLAF also helped halt 
smuggled cigarettes carried by passengers arriving 
into the EU. Investigators worked closely with 
individual Member States and conducted several 
checks at major airports, which resulted in the 
combined seizure of more than 1 million cigarettes.
SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT PESTICIDES:
A particularly worrying trend is the smuggling of illegal 
pesticides on the European market. Illicit pesticides, 
usually smuggled with the involvement of organised 
crime, have a negative impact on economies and on the 
environment and can cause serious health problems for 
consumers. 
To help curb this trend, OLAF participated 
in Operation Silver Axe II, a joint campaign 
coordinated by Europol together with the 
Netherlands. The operation targeted counterfeit and 
illicit pesticides in the major seaports, airports and at 
land borders of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.
The authorities of these EU Member States 
inspected over 940 shipments of plant protection 
products and discovered almost 122 tons of 
 illegal or counterfeit pesticides. This result 
confirmed previous estimates, namely that illegal 
pesticides represent around 10% of the entire 
EU pesticide market, although evidence suggests 
that there are considerable differences between 
Member States. 
Figure 11: Cigarettes seized with the support of OLAF (rounded to million sticks)
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Coordination and investigation cases 281 168 602 458 470
JCOs 68 132 17 11 75
Total 349 300 619 469 545
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OLAF particularly focused on the selection of 
suspicious shipments of pesticides coming from third 
countries which were declared in transit in the EU, or 
which were subject to transhipment operations and/
or storage in free zones. While the use of such free 
zones combined with the transhipment of containers 
is usually a standard commercial and logistical 
operation, minimum or no customs oversight in the 
free zones can encourage the development of illegal 
activities. This can take the form of concealment of 
the true origin of products in order to avoid higher 
customs duties, or concealment of the transport route 
for illicit products, such as counterfeit products or the 
traffic in dangerous substances. 
DRUG PRECURSORS:
Drug precursors are chemical products necessary for 
the illegal manufacture of drugs, e.g. ephedrine for 
methamphetamine, 3,4 - Methylenedioxyphenylpropan-2-
one (PMK) for ecstasy, Phenyl-2-propanone (BMK) for 
amphetamine, acetic anhydride for heroin and potassium 
permanganate for cocaine. However, these chemicals also 
have large and varied legitimate uses in the production 
of plastics, medicinal products, cosmetics, detergents, 
fragrances and flavours. Due to their wide legitimate 
uses, trade in drug precursors cannot be prohibited. Drug 
precursors are therefore controlled through monitoring 
their licit trade in order to ensure that they are not 
diverted to illicit uses.
Drug precursors are a global problem which requires 
international cooperation. Having the sole responsibility 
within the European Commission for operational matters 
in the drug precursors area at EU level, OLAF is a member 
of the UN-INCB international Task Force for Projects 
Prism and Cohesion, which focuses on the prevention 
of the diversion from legal trade in Amphetamine-
Type Stimulant drug precursors, as well as on key drug 
precursors for cocaine and heroin. In the framework 
of these projects, OLAF and national authorities are 
able to react to changing patterns of diversion and 
trafficking, including of non-scheduled substances 
such as alpha-phenylacetoacetamide (APAA, 3-oxo-2-
phenylbutanamide) which can be used as a pre-precursor 
for amphetamines. 
OLAF’s key role is to ensure a coordinated approach within 
the EU, assisting Member States in their investigations, 
and coordinating their efforts by exchanging information 
about suspicious transactions, stopped shipments or 
seizures and by facilitating in vestigations. OLAF also 
organises operational meetings between the investigative 
services, both within the EU and between EU investigators 
and their third-country counterparts. 
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3.6. New tools to combat  
customs fraud 
In 2016, an update of Regulation 515/97 empowered 
OLAF to create new IT systems that allow the EU and its 
Member States to track and trace suspicious shipments 
better and thus detect customs fraud.  As a result, a 
Container Status Messages (CSM) database was set 
up to gather messages recording the movements of 
containers transported on maritime vessels. Similarly, an 
Import, Export and Transit (IET) directory has also been 
developed, containing data on goods entering, transiting 
and leaving the EU. Data relating to exports is limited to 
sensitive products, such as tobacco, alcohol and fuels. 
The databases are already being widely used. By the 
end of 2017, the CSM database had received 820 million 
messages, and facilitated the work of 1595 users. The 
five most represented Member States were Germany, 
France, the UK, Belgium and Romania. Since it was 
launched, and up to the end of 2017, more than 28000 
searches have been performed in CSM, with the most 
searches coming from Germany, the UK, the European 
Commission, France and the Netherlands.
In the same period, the IET directory received 7.5 million 
export and 45.8 million transit messages and was employed 
by 716 users. The five most represented Member States 
were Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Denmark. Almost 
3000 searches were executed in the system until the end 
of December 2017, mostly by the European Commission, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia.
These new tools, which will hopefully be employed 
by an increasing number of users, will strengthen the 
analytical capabilities of national customs authorities 
and OLAF in detecting fraudulent operations. They will 
thus contribute to a better detection of revenue fraud 
across Europe.
3.7. Looking towards the future – 
E-commerce and the potential 
for customs fraud
With e-commerce as a booming and largely less 
regulated market, the potential for customs and VAT 
fraud is a growing concern for anti-fraud investigators. 
A study6 by the European Intellectual Property Office 
(EUIPO) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) revealed that, in 
2013, small shipments, linked to e-commerce and usually 
sent through the post or through courier services, 
accounted for 43% of all shipments. This number is very 
likely to continue increasing. Small shipments may seem 
innocuous at first sight. However, they pose a number 
of problems for law enforcement authorities. It is very 
difficult to control the flow of goods arriving in small 
consignments, as customs officers do not generally have 
the capacity to go through a large number of micro-
shipments. This means, for example, that counterfeit 
products or undervalued goods arriving in small 
consignments can be much harder to detect and can 
escape the enforcement net. 
In addition, there is evidence that suggests that small 
consignments arriving in Europe are regrouped in larger 
warehouses. Once e-orders are placed from Europe, the 
goods are shipped, from such warehouses, hiding the 
initial origin of the goods. This may contribute to evading 
the applicable import taxes and duties. As described 
in the study mentioned above, this may also offer 
consumers a false sense of security.
OLAF is attentive to this trend and will continue to 
explore avenues for cooperation with Member States and 
third countries, as well as with the European Commission 
in order to tackle enforcement problems related to the 
e-commerce sphere. 
6  See footnote 4 
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4. OLAF on the European  
and international scene
4.1. OLAF relations with its partners
Both from an investigative and policy-making 
perspective, the work carried out by OLAF can only 
lead to tangible results on the ground if the Office 
joins forces with other European and international 
institutions to engage in the global fight against fraud 
and corruption. This is why in 2017 OLAF has continued 
to develop existing partnerships and to enter into 
agreements with new partners worldwide.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERS
Administrative Cooperation Arrangements (ACAs) are 
a key tool in helping OLAF foster close relationships 
with investigative bodies and other non-investigative 
partners engaged in the fight against fraud. In 2017, 
OLAF signed two ACAs with Member States autho-
rities7, as well as two ACAs with partner authorities in 
non-EU countries and territories8. OLAF also concluded 
two new ACAs with EU institutions and bodies: one 
with the Council of the European Union and one with 
the Committee of the Regions. 
7  With the Italian Carabinieri and Italian Direzione Nazionale 
Antimafia (DNA).
8  With the Tunisian General Inspection for Finance and with the 
Kosovo Police (This designation is without prejudice to positions 
on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence).
B. ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
FOR COORDINATION OF  
FRAUD PREVENTION (COCOLAF)
OLAF steers and chairs the Advisory Committee for 
Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF), composed 
of representatives of Member States’ authorities. The 
2017 annual COCOLAF meeting provided an opportunity 
to exchange views on the main developments in the 
fight against fraud and the preparation of the Article 325 
TFEU Report on the ‘Protection of the European Union’s 
financial interests — Fight against fraud 2016’.
In 2017, the specific COCOLAF subgroups worked on:
  exchanging experience and best practice between 
Anti-Fraud Coordination Services of the Member 
States (AFCOS);
  sharing the results of analyses about main fraud and 
irregularity trends and patterns;
  drafting fraud prevention documents such as 
“Fraud in Public Procurement – Collection of Red 
flags and best practices” and the Handbook on the 
‘Irregularity Reporting’; 
  sharing media strategies and organising 
communication activities on fraud prevention and 
deterrence.
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C. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE  
AND ANTI-FRAUD CLAUSES
Cooperation with third countries with a view to 
preventing, detecting and combating breaches of 
customs legislation is based on agreements on mutual 
administrative assistance in customs matters. Such 
agreements provide the required legal basis in the 
context of Article 19 of Regulation 515/97 for the 
exchange of information with third countries on fraud 
or irregularity. More than 70 agreements are currently 
in place, including with major EU trade partners, like the 
United States, China or Japan. In addition, negotiations 
to update the previous agreements with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have been finalised, as well as those on 
a new agreement with Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay).
Free trade agreements usually contain an anti-fraud 
clause which allows for a temporary withdrawal of tariff 
preference for a product in cases of serious customs 
fraud and persistent lack of adequate cooperation to 
combat it. OLAF actively contributes to the negotiations 
of such clauses. In 2017, a clause was agreed at technical 
level with Japan and good progress was made in on-
going negotiations with Mercosur.
An important development in 2017 was the entry 
into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 
(Bali Agreement), to which the EU is a party. Article 
12 on customs cooperation provides for additional 
possibilities to exchange information with third 
countries with the purpose of verifying an import or 
export declaration where there are reasonable grounds 
to doubt the truth or accuracy of the declaration.
4.2. The Hercule III Programme:  
a key tool in supporting the fight 
against fraud across  the EU
OLAF is responsible for the management of the 
Hercule  III Programme9 which supports actions and 
projects that aim to protect the financial interests of 
the EU. The Programme has a budget of over EUR 100 
million for the period 2014-2020. It is implemented on 
9  Regulation (EU) No. 250/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 establishing a 
programme to promote activities in the field of the protection 
of the financial interests of the European Union (Hercule III 
programme) and repealing Decision No. 804/2004/EC, OJ L 
84 of 20 March 2014, p. 6-13.
the basis of annual work programmes setting out the 
budget and the funding priorities for a given calendar 
year. The annual work programme10 for 2017 made 
available a budget of EUR 14.95 million for the purchase 
of, for example, specialised technical equipment by 
law enforcement agencies in the Member States, such 
as customs or police forces. The financial support was 
used for the purchase of a wide range of equipment, 
like scanners used in harbours or airports, digital 
forensic software and hardware, or the purchase and 
training of sniffer dogs. The Programme also supported 
conferences, seminars and training events attended 
by staff of national administrations, law enforcement 
agencies and NGOs in order to strengthen mutual 
cooperation or the exchange of best practice. The 
Programme funded digital forensic training aimed 
at improving the skills of anti-fraud professionals in 
securing evidence from digital devices.  
The Programme was the subject of a mid-term 
evaluation as required under Article 13 of Regulation 
250/201411, which showed the Programme is successful. 
The evaluation also gathered ideas for possible new 
directions for the Programme going forward, for 
instance in the areas of cross-border cooperation 
between Member States, cooperation with non-EU 
partners, as well as on new technological developments. 
10  Adopted by Commission Decision C(2017)1120 final of 22 
February 2017.
11  Regulation (EU) No. 250/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 establishing a 
programme to promote activities in the field of the protection 
of the financial interests of the European Union (Hercule III 
programme) and repealing Decision No. 804/2004/EC, OJ L 
84 of 20 March 2014, p. 6-13.
Airplane scanner, Belgium
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5. Monitoring the actions taken by the 
recipients of OLAF recommendations 
5.1. Financial monitoring
OLAF INVESTIGATIONS LEAD  
TO HIGH AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED  
FOR RECOVERY TO THE EU BUDGET
Financial recommendations are addressed by OLAF to 
the EU Institutions or national authorities providing or 
managing EU funds. The aim of such financial recom-
mendations is to seek the recovery of the defrauded 
EU funds to the EU budget. The sum recommended by 
OLAF for recovery each year depends on the scope and 
scale of the investigations concluded in that given year. 
The amount of recommended recoveries is therefore 
not an indication of the overall fraud level in Europe, 
but relates to specific investigations OLAF has finalised 
in a particular year.
Pursuant to the investigations it concluded in 2017, 
OLAF recommended the recovery of over EUR 3 billion 
to the EU budget. This sum is significantly higher than 
in preceding years because of the conclusion of large-
scale investigations in the customs field (see the Focus 
Chapter of this Report for more detail).
It is important to note that OLAF is not itself responsible 
for the recovery of these funds. This money will progre-
ssively be recovered by the relevant authorities at EU and 
Member State level.  Money can be retrieved from the 
beneficiaries of the funds, national managing authorities 
or paying agencies in a number of ways, including direct 
recovery, offsetting, deduction, de-commitment, pro-
gramme closure, or clearance of accounts.
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF OLAF’S 
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE OVERALL 
DETECTION OF IRREGULARITIES  
ACROSS EUROPE
Member States are responsible for most EU spending 
and also manage the collection of the EU’s customs 
revenue. Their activities represent the first line of 
defence against any attempt to defraud the EU budget. 
OLAF counts on national authorities to perform their 
work efficiently and diligently, and supports them 
through an active exchange of information and via 
targeted trainings. 
Under sectoral regulations, Member States have to 
report to the European Commission any irregularity or 
suspicion of fraud12 they detect exceeding EUR 10000. 
An analysis of this data is compiled in the Commission’s 
Annual Report on the protection of the EU financial 
interests (the so-called “PIF Report”).
In parallel with data concerning Member States’ 
detections, OLAF also gathers data on the number of 
investigations it has concluded and that led to financial 
recommendations.
In recent annual Reports, OLAF has presented a 
comparative analysis in the areas of Traditional Own 
Resources (TOR) and shared management, providing an 
overview of the number of fraudulent and non-fraudu-
lent irregularities detected by national authorities, 
compared to the financial recommendations issued 
by OLAF in the same areas. In this year’s Report, the 
analysis covers a period of five years, including 2017. The 
impact of investigations is shown as a percentage of the 
12  A case can be defined as fraud only after a definitive sentence 
is issued by a competent judicial authority. This can take a few 
years following the detection and reporting of the case to the 
Commission.
Figure 12: Amount recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in 2017 (in millions)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Amounts recommended 284 403 901 888 631 3095
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total TOR that authorities have collected for the years 
2013-2017 and as a percentage of the total payments 
made under the two main areas of shared management 
by each Member State. The results obtained by OLAF 
during the same period are presented next to those of 
national authorities13.
For the purpose of our analysis, it is assumed that 
financial recommendations issued by OLAF following 
investigations are comparable to the financial impact of 
irregularities detected and reported by Member States.
Figure 13 shows the number of irregularities/fraud cases 
detected in the area of Traditional Own Resources 
between 2013 and 2017 and the percentage that their 
financial impact represents in terms of the gross TOR 
collected by Member States and made available to the 
EU budget. OLAF results are shown alongside those of 
national authorities. 
Figure 14 shows the number of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent irregularities detected in the two main 
areas of shared management, European Structural and 
Investment Funds and Agriculture, between 2013-2017 
and their financial impact expressed as a percentage of 
the total payments for the years 2012-2016, divided by 
Member State. OLAF results are shown alongside those 
of national authorities.
13  Results by the Member States and OLAF may partially 
overlap. OLAF results are extracted from the Case 
Management System, and represent the total sum of financial 
recommendations issued at the end of the investigations. Data 
concerning Member States is extracted from the Irregularity 
Management System (IMS) for the two expenditure areas and 
from the OWNRES system for TOR. Data used in this report 
needs to be considered as provisional. Final data is published in 
the ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the Protection of the European Union’s 
financial interests — Fight against fraud ’ which will be 
published around July 2018.
Our analysis highlights once again the important 
contribution that OLAF investigations are making in 
helping the relevant authorities recover EU revenue and 
funds that have been defrauded or irregularly spent. In 
terms of Traditional Own Resources, OLAF financial 
recommendations would represent 2.58% of the gross 
TOR collected, compared to 2.01% for all Member 
States together. This means that, for this period, OLAF 
financial recommendations exceed the entire financial 
impact of the investigative and control activities of 
the Member States. The OLAF results are significantly 
influenced by the conclusion of investigations linked to 
the undervaluation of imported goods in 201714. These 
results also highlight OLAF’s commitment to utilising 
resources effectively and concentrating on cases where 
its input would bring most added value. 
OLAF results are significant also in the shared 
management areas, where the financial impact of the 
activities of all Member States together accounts for 
1.8% of payments, while OLAF alone recommended 
the recovery of 0.43% of payments. In this area, OLAF 
financial recommendations would represent 19% to 
23%15 of the entire impact of investigative and control 
activities. There are countries where the financial 
impact of OLAF cases is particularly significant and, at 
times, even higher than that of national investigations. 
14  For more details, see chapter 3.
15  The range has been calculated assuming, for the lower limit, 
that OLAF results are not included in those reported by the 
Member States, while for the highest limit, the assumption 
is the opposite - that OLAF results are fully included in those 
reported by the Member States.
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Figure 13:  Member State/ OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the area  
of Traditional Own Resources for the period 2013-2017
Traditional Own Resources (TOR) 2013-2017
Member State
Member States OLAF
Detected fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent 
irregularities
Financial impact as % 
of TOR collected
Investigations 
closed with 
recommendations
Financial 
recommendations as 
% TOR collected
N % N %
Austria 335 2.81% 11 0.25%
Belgium 1 011 1.07% 27 0.87%
Bulgaria 119 0.96% 16 1.21%
Croatia 64 1.75% 2 0.07%
Cyprus 42 1.49% 9 0.18%
Czech Republic 383 2.34% 18 1.61%
Denmark 339 1.43% 16 0.56%
Estonia 35 2.17% 7 0.29%
Finland 187 1.19% 8 0.15%
France 1 822 1.82% 24 0.34%
Germany 9 250 2.23% 35 0.23%
Greece 226 7.10% 13 0.75%
Hungary 199 1.80% 12 0.29%
Ireland 146 1.06% 10 0.06%
Italy 832 1.34% 31 0.24%
Latvia 117 4.88% 10 2.10%
Lithuania 225 2.26% 14 1.02%
Luxembourg 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Malta 17 4.52% 3 1.32%
Netherlands 2 257 2.99% 48 1.86%
Poland 713 1.07% 25 0.85%
Portugal 162 2.55% 16 1.22%
Romania 337 3.37% 27 1.56%
Slovakia 82 0.98% 11 50.30%
Slovenia 57 0.63% 14 0.55%
Spain 1 683 2.77% 34 1.06%
Sweden 478 1.08% 14 0.30%
United Kingdom 4 990 1.90% 41 11.07%
Total 26 108 2.01% 496 2.58%
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Figure 14:  Member State/ OLAF detection of irregularities and their financial impact in the areas  
of European Structural and Investment Funds and Agriculture for the period 2013-2017
Shared Management: Cohesion and Natural Resources 2013-2017
Member State
Member States OLAF
Detected fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent 
irregularities
Financial impact as % 
of payments
Investigations 
closed with 
recommendations
Financial 
recommendations as 
% of payments
N % N %
Austria 371 0.30% 2 0.02%
Belgium 387 0.48% 1 0.02%
Bulgaria 904 1.67% 43 0.54%
Croatia 86 0.56% 1 0.00%
Cyprus 104 0.89% 0 0.00%
Czech Republic 3 480 3.40% 7 0.08%
Denmark 205 0.30% 0 0.00%
Estonia 414 1.54% 0 0.00%
Finland 139 0.08% 0 0.00%
France 1 240 0.28% 8 0.01%
Germany 1 771 0.33% 7 0.40%
Greece 2 251 2.76% 14 0.30%
Hungary 2 808 1.20% 49 3.92%
Ireland 1 432 2.41% 0 0.00%
Italy 4 101 1.27% 20 0.31%
Latvia 611 2.89% 1 0.00%
Lithuania 1 109 2.21% 3 0.06%
Luxembourg 2 0.09% 0 0.00%
Malta 117 2.42% 1 0.43%
Netherlands 813 1.74% 4 0.04%
Poland 5 461 1.74% 21 0.09%
Portugal 2 422 1.49% 9 0.36%
Romania 5 759 3.21% 107 0.52%
Slovakia 1 672 11.39% 16 2.09%
Slovenia 297 1.92% 1 0.12%
Spain 11 161 3.13% 5 0.40%
Sweden 224 0.21% 0 0.00%
United Kingdom 3 062 0.75% 5 0.04%
Total 52 403 1.83% 325 0.43%
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5.2. Judicial monitoring
Judicial monitoring allows OLAF to see the final 
outcome of its cases on the ground, be it indictments, 
dismissals, or other judicial measures, if any. 
According to Article 11 of Regulation 883/201316, at the 
request of the Office, the national judicial authorities 
concerned must send OLAF information on the action 
taken on the basis of its judicial recommendations.   
Based on judicial monitoring carried out in 2017, OLAF 
noted that around 42% of the cases it submitted to 
national judicial authorities have led to indictments. 
While judicial authorities are of course independent 
and while the legal architecture may vary at Member 
State level, OLAF has worked on understanding the 
reasons why national judiciaries dismissed some of the 
cases OLAF had submitted. 
It is not for OLAF to question the validity of national 
prosecutors’ decisions to dismiss individual cases on 
particular grounds. However, OLAF’s analysis confirms 
the argument in support of the setting-up of a European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office. It appears that Article 11§2 
of Regulation 883/2013[1], and prior to that, Article 9§2 
16  OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p.1
of Regulation 1073/1999 which was identical, is not a 
sufficient legal basis to allow all Member States’ judicial 
authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. 
Therefore, in numerous Member States, after receiving 
the OLAF final report, prosecutors carry out all the 
investigation activities once again in order to acquire 
admissible evidence. 
Sometimes, despite considerable investigative efforts 
deployed by the Office, its limited investigation powers 
and practical possibilities do not allow to collect 
conclusive evidence of a criminal offence.
As regards internal investigations, whereas for OLAF 
any infringement committed by EU staff is regarded as 
a serious matter, irrespective of the prejudice to the EU 
budget, the priorities of the national judiciaries may be 
different.
Finally, there are sometimes differences of interpreta-
tion of EU and national law between OLAF and national 
authorities. OLAF started in 2016 to address these dif-
ferences, through bilateral meetings with the relevant 
judicial authorities. This work continues to date. OLAF 
liaises with Member States on an on-going basis in or-
der to try and improve follow-up at national level.
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Figure 15:  Actions taken by national judicial authorities (JA) following OLAF’s recommendations issued 
between 1 January 2010 and December 2017
Member state No decision taken by JA Decision taken by JA Indictment rate
Total Dismissed Indictment
Austria 1 7 5 2 29%
Belgium 12 32 17 15 47%
Bulgaria 13 22 13 9 41%
Croatia 4 0 0 0 NA
Cyprus 4 3 2 1 33%
Czech Republic 3 8 6 2 25%
Denmark 1 3 1 2 67%
Estonia 0 2 1 1 50%
Finland 0 3 3 0 0%
France 9 8 3 5 63%
Germany 14 19 15 4 21%
Greece 16 11 3 8 73%
Hungary 20 17 9 8 47%
Ireland 1 2 2 0 0%
Italy 20 33 14 19 58%
Latvia 1 4 3 1 25%
Lithuania 0 9 3 6 67%
Luxembourg 5 5 3 2 40%
Malta 1 6 0 6 100%
Netherlands 10 7 3 4 57%
Poland 13 11 2 9 82%
Portugal 9 7 5 2 29%
Romania 26 87 58 29 33%
Slovakia 5 11 9 2 18%
Slovenia 4 1 0 1 100%
Spain 11 19 15 4 21%
Sweden 1 2 1 1 50%
United 
Kingdom
21 14 9 5 36%
Grand Total 225 353 205 148 42%
* In the category of no decision taken, we include also those cases that are still in the so-called “reporting period”. When OLAF sends a 
judicial recommendation to a Member State, the competent authority has to report on the actions taken following the recommendation 
within 12 months.
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5.3. Disciplinary monitoring
EU Institutions take action to follow up on OLAF’s 
internal investigations
The disciplinary recommendations issued by OLAF con-
cern serious misconduct of EU staff or Members of the 
EU institutions and are directed to the authority hav-
ing disciplinary powers in the institution concerned. 
When making such recommendations, OLAF does not 
specify the type of action that should be taken. The 
appointing authorities sometimes take several actions 
following a single recommendation from OLAF. At the 
same time, the appointing authority may join several 
recommendations resulting from different investiga-
tions and, subsequently, impose one single sanction. 
Figure 16:  Actions taken by the appointing authorities following OLAF’s disciplinary recommendations 
issued between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2017 
Recipient of recommendation Total No decision taken Decision taken
No case is made Action taken
Agencies 8 3 4 1
Court of Justice 2 0 2 0
European Commission 22 4 6 12
European Economic and Social Committee 1 0 1 0
European External Action Service 6 1 2 3
European Investment Bank 1 1 0 0
European Parliament 16 4 1 11
Council of the EU 1 0 0 1
EULEX 1 1 0 0
Total 58 14 16 28
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6. Policies to fight fraud
In addition to its investigative work, OLAF plays 
an active role in the development of the anti-fraud 
policies of the European Union. The Office drafts and 
negotiates legislative texts concerning the protection 
of the EU’s financial interests against fraud and 
corruption. It is also  thanks to its solid investigative 
expertise, that OLAF can support the EU institutions in 
furthering a sound legal framework to protect the EU 
budget and taxpayers’ money. The main policy projects 
on which OLAF has made significant progress in 2017 
are summarised in this chapter.
6.1. Evaluation of Regulation  
(EU, Euratom) No 883/2013
Regulation 883/2013 is the main legal instrument gover-
ning OLAF’s investigative activities. As required by the 
applicable regulatory framework, on 2 October 2017, the 
Commission adopted its Report on the Evaluation of the 
application of Regulation 883/201317. The Commission 
Report was supported by an independent external 
study18 and was based on a wide-ranging stakeholder 
consultation. The Report was also accompanied by 
OLAF’s Supervisory Committee’s Opinion 2/201719.
A dedicated conference was organised by OLAF in March 
2017. The conference brought together stakeholders 
from a wide range of anti-fraud backgrounds, such 
as the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services of Member 
States, Member State administrative authorities, law 
enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial authorities, EU 
Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, international 
organisations and academics. The outcome of 
discussions was taken on board for the external 
evaluation report. 
17  See footnote 16.
18  ICF Consulting Services Limited, 2017, Evaluation of 
the application of Regulation no 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF), Final report, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/
antifraud/files/evaluation_of_the_application_regulation_883_
en.pdf
19  OLAF Supervisory Committee, Opinion 2/2017 
“Accompanying the Commission Evaluation report on the 
application of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and 
of the Council No 883/2013 (Article 19)”, http://europa.eu/
supervisory-committee-olaf/sites/default/files/opinion_2_2017.
pdf.
The evaluation concluded that the Regulation has 
allowed OLAF to deliver concrete results. Regulation 
883/2013 brought clear improvements in OLAF’s 
functioning, as regards the conduct of investigations, 
cooperation with partners and the rights of persons 
concerned by investigations. At the same time, the 
evaluation highlighted some shortcomings which 
have an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of investigations. In particular, the extent to which 
the Regulation makes national law applicable is not 
completely clear. Today, different interpretations of the 
relevant provisions and differences in national law lead 
to a fragmentation in the exercise of OLAF’s powers in 
the Member States. In some cases, this hinders OLAF’s 
ability to conduct investigations successfully and to 
contribute to an effective protection of the financial 
interests across the EU. 
Moreover, the evaluation also emphasised that the 
creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO) will be a game-changer and will require swift 
adaptations in the operation of OLAF, to ensure 
synergies and the efficient use of resources at EU level. 
In view of the establishment of the EPPO and in light 
of the results of the evaluation, the Commission has 
prepared an assessment in line with Better Regulation 
principles20 with a view to a proposal for the amendment 
of Regulation 883/2013 mid-2018. The proposal will 
adapt the functioning of OLAF to the establishment 
of the EPPO, to ensure close cooperation based on 
the complementarity of their respective mandates and 
prepare the support of OLAF to the EPPO. It will also 
consider targeted changes, necessary to strengthen the 
framework for OLAF investigations, in order to maintain 
a strong and fully-functioning OLAF that complements 
the EPPO’s criminal law approach with administrative 
investigations. This amended text should be in force by 
the time the EPPO becomes operational, to ensure a 
seamless transition to the new institutional framework.
20  Commission Staff Working Document ‘Better regulation 
guidelines’, 7 July 2017 SWD (2017) 350 https://ec.europa.eu/
info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines.pdf   
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6.2. Preparing for the creation  
of the European Public 
Prosecutor (EPP0)
On 31 October 2017, the Regulation on the creation of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office was published 
in the Official Journal21. The EPPO represents a 
significant institutional innovation which will provide 
the EU budget with better protection against fraud 
and will also change the landscape of justice in Europe. 
It will operate as a single body across all participating 
Member States. The EPPO will tackle fraud and 
corruption affecting the EU budget, including serious 
cases of cross-border VAT fraud, and will be equipped 
to deal with complex, transnational cases in a more 
efficient way than is possible today. The EPPO will be 
established under enhanced cooperation (at this stage) 
among twenty Member States, and is expected to start 
operations at the end of 2020. Other EU Members can 
join at any time. 
The EPPO and OLAF will work closely together, to 
ensure that all available means are used to protect the 
EU budget. The EPPO will be able to rely on the support 
of OLAF, benefitting from OLAF’s experience in the 
fight against fraud affecting EU funds. 
21  Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 
implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 
31.10.2017, p. 1–71.
6.3. The adoption of the PIF Directive
Following the political agreement reached between the 
co-legislators at the end of 2016, the Directive on the 
fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests 
by means of criminal law was adopted on 5 July 201722. 
Member States now have two years (until July 2019) to 
transpose it into their national legislation. 
The Directive will strengthen the protection of the 
Union’s financial interests by harmonising the definition 
of offences affecting these interests (offences of fraud, 
corruption, money laundering and misappropriation), 
as well as harmonising sanctions and time limitations 
for such cases. It covers cross-border VAT fraud cases 
involving a total damage of at least EUR 10 Million. The 
Directive will replace the Convention on the protection 
of the European Communities’ financial interests and its 
protocols (PIF Convention) for those 26 Member States 
bound by the Directive, while the Convention remains 
applicable to Denmark and the UK. 
22  Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, 
p. 29–41.
European Commissioner for 
Budget and Human Resources, 
Günther H. Oettinger, joined 
more than 200 stakeholders 
at a high-level conference on 
1-2 March 2017 in Brussels.  
“I can only commend OLAF for 
its impressive work in protecting 
the EU budget and helping 
ensure that citizens’ money goes 
towards projects that improve 
the lives of all Europeans,” 
Commissioner Oettinger said. 
Commissioner for Budget & Human Resources Günther H. Oettinger (right) at the Conference on the evaluation 
of Regulation 883/2013, in March 2017
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6.4. Strengthening the EU’s policy on 
fighting the illicit tobacco trade
In addition to its enforcement role in fighting the illicit 
tobacco trade, OLAF also contributes to strengthening 
the EU’s policy in this field.
In May 2017, the Commission adopted a Report on the 
progress in implementing the 2013 Strategy to step up 
the fight against the illicit tobacco trade23.  The report 
highlighted that important milestones have been 
reached, notably the adoption of the Tobacco Products 
Directive24 and the ratification of the FCTC Protocol 
to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products by the 
EU. Targeted enforcement action has also led to new 
records in seizure volumes. However, the smuggling of 
tobacco products has not receded, and reflections will 
continue on additional initiatives to stem especially the 
inflow of so-called ‘cheap white’ cigarettes. OLAF will 
continue to drive such initiatives.
23  COM(2017)235 final.
24  Directive 2014/40/EU of 3 April 2014, OJ L 127, 29.4.2014, p. 1.
The EU, with OLAF as lead service, had a key role 
in negotiating the FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit 
Trade in Tobacco Products, under the auspices of the 
World Health Organisation. The EU became a Party 
to the Protocol in 2016. However, the Protocol will 
only effectively help curbing illicit trade if it is also 
implemented by third countries which are the main 
source of illicit tobacco products, or are transit countries 
on the smuggling routes. The Commission is intensifying 
its efforts to promote the Protocol outside the EU while 
assisting Member States in the quick completion of 
their internal ratification procedures. OLAF is engaged 
in these discussions on the European and international 
scene.
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7. Relations with the Supervisory Committee 
The Supervisory Committee of OLAF is a body of five 
independent outside experts, established to reinforce 
and guarantee OLAF’s independence by regularly 
monitoring the implementation of OLAF’s investigative 
function. Its members are appointed by common 
agreement of the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission. 
The Members as of 31 December 2017 are the following: 
Ms Fazenda, Mr Klement, Mr Mulder, Mr Munoz Lopez 
Carmona and Ms Stronikowska. Mr Mulder has been 
Chairman since March 2017.
In line with Regulation 883/2013, the Members are 
supported by a Secretariat. As of 1 January 2017, 
following an amendment of Regulation 883/2013, the 
Supervisory Committee Secretariat is provided by the 
Commission, outside OLAF. 
The Director-General of OLAF keeps the Supervisory 
Committee regularly informed of the Office’s activities, 
the implementation of OLAF’s investigative function, 
and of action taken by way of follow-up to investigations. 
In 2017, in accordance with Regulation 883/2013, OLAF 
made available to the Committee over 430 documents 
with information on investigations lasting more than 12 
months. OLAF also informed the Committee of judicial 
recommendations transmitted to the national judicial 
authorities, and of OLAF cases in which information 
was sent to national judicial authorities at the dismissal 
of the case. The Committee and its Secretariat had full 
access to 64 case files in OLAF’s case management 
system in 2017.
On the basis of the information provided by OLAF, the 
Committee delivers Opinions to the Director-General 
of OLAF and reports to the EU institutions. In 2017, 
the Supervisory Committee delivered three Opinions. 
Opinion 2/2016, issued in February 2017, concerned the 
OLAF Annual Activity Report, to which OLAF replied 
on 27 March 2017. Opinion 1/2017 concerned the OLAF 
Preliminary Draft Budget for 2018, to which OLAF 
replied on 6 October 2017. The Committee’s Opinion 
No 2/2017 accompanied the Commission Evaluation 
report on the application of Regulation 883/2013.
In its Opinions, the Supervisory Committee issues 
recommendations to the Director-General. OLAF 
reports annually to the Committee on the state of 
implementation of these recommendations. On 9 
February 2018, OLAF reported on all recommendations 
issued in 2017, and also on the follow-up of one 
recommendation issued in 2016 by the Committee. 
Details of the Committee’s work can be found in 
its annual activity report. This report and OLAF’s 
responses, as well as other information, are publicly 
available on the OLAF website.  
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8. Data protection, legality checks  
and complaints
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA 
CRUCIAL TO OLAF’S WORK
The protection of personal data is key to a successful 
investigation since it allows safeguarding the rights of 
individuals involved at any step of the investigative cycle. 
Since OLAF was set up as an independent investigative 
body, it has appointed its own data protection officer 
(DPO) who ensures that OLAF implements the 
requirements of Regulation 45/2001 on the protection 
of personal data, including recommendations of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The 
decisions and recommendations of the EDPS have 
a significant impact on how OLAF carries out its 
investigative activities, such as on-the-spot checks or 
the forensic examination of digital media.
In 2017, OLAF maintained its commitment to ensure 
the timely provision of relevant information to data 
subjects. OLAF received and handled ten requests 
for access to personal data as well as one request for 
rectification. They were all handled in a timely manner.
The current Regulation 45/2001 is under revision to 
align with the General Data Protection Regulation 
2016/679 (GDPR) entering into force in May 2018.  OLAF 
has already conducted awareness-raising activities 
internally and has mapped the necessary steps to 
achieve compliance with the new data protection rules. 
VERY LOW NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS  
ON OLAF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
Persons affected by an OLAF investigation may address 
a complaint directly to the Director-General of OLAF. 
This is without prejudice to the citizens’ right to lodge 
a complaint with the European Ombudsman, or to raise 
issues related to OLAF investigations before the EU or 
national courts. 
In 2017, the Director-General received seven complaints 
from persons involved in OLAF investigations about 
issues relating to the handling of their procedural 
guarantees. All of the complainants received a 
substantiated reply within the two-month deadline in 
accordance with the established procedures.
Officials and other EU staff may also complain to OLAF 
under Article 90a of the Staff Regulations against any 
act adversely affecting them in connection with OLAF 
investigations. In 2017, OLAF received one complaint in 
which Article 90a of the Staff Regulations was invoked. 
The response to the complaint is pending.
In 2017, the European Ombudsman opened ten new 
inquiries in relation to complaints involving OLAF. 
Seven were closed in the course of the year either 
without a finding of maladministration or because OLAF 
had settled the matter. The remaining three concern two 
requests for public access to documents and a decision 
not to open an investigation, and are still pending. 
In the course of 2017, the Ombudsman also concluded 
two inquiries that had been opened in previous years. 
The first inquiry concerned a request for access to 
documents. OLAF disagreed with the Ombudsman as 
to the scope of the request and the case was closed 
with a finding of maladministration. However, after 
the complainant came back with a new request, OLAF 
gave partial access to the requested documents, to 
the complainant’s satisfaction. The second inquiry 
concerned alleged irregularities during an investigation. 
In particular, the complainant argued that OLAF had 
failed to follow its normal administrative practices when 
opening that investigation and wrongly communicated 
information about its investigation to third parties. 
The Ombudsman found that OLAF complied with the 
relevant applicable rules and the principles of good 
administration. As a result, the Ombudsman closed 
her inquiry with a finding of no maladministration. In 
2017, the Ombudsman published her ‘Putting it Right’ 
Report for cases closed in 2016, in which OLAF scored 
the maximum of 100% satisfactory replies to the 
Ombudsman.
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Figure 17: Number and breakdown of OLAF staff from 2010 to 2017
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Establishment posts occupied 360 351 347 350 362 356 336 318
Establishment posts vacant 46 33 35 34 18 11 24 32
External staff 60 53 53 56 59 55 55 55
Total 466 437 435 440 439 422 415 405
9. Staff and Budget 
INVESTING IN STAFF
In the context of the general reductions in staff and 
budget in the EU public service, the number of OLAF 
staff members continued to decrease in 2017. At the 
end of 2017, the total number of staff members and 
available vacancies at OLAF stood at 405, a 2.5% 
decrease compared to 2016. Despite this, OLAF did its 
outmost to maintain the staff resources allocated to the 
fight against fraud and to its anti-fraud policy work, with 
staff cuts mainly impacting overhead functions such as 
HR, finance and ICT infrastructure management. 
OLAF staff members have had to adapt to a structural 
increase in workload, while maintaining the quality 
and efficiency of investigations. In a context of limited 
resources, OLAF counts on the wide range of skills and 
diverse professional background of its staff. Dealing 
efficiently with a high number of investigations in 
various fields and countries requires a high level of 
expertise, knowledge of a broad range of languages, as 
well as commitment to defending taxpayers’ interests. 
Two specialist competitions in the investigation field 
were finalised in 2017, providing OLAF with a list of 
45 laureates possessing the relevant professional 
experience and qualifications.
OLAF invests continuously in career development. 
OLAF staff have the opportunity to participate in 
European Commission or external training, coaching 
sessions, or lunchtime debates and workshops, which 
further their professional and personal development. 
OLAF is also committed to investing in the training of 
its managers, to ensure excellent leadership.
Figure 18: OLAF’s administrative budget in 2017 (million EUR)
EU staff 42.1
Infrastructure 6.7
ICT 4.9
External agents (contract staff, seconded national experts and interims) 2.5
Missions 1.4
Anti-fraud Measures 1.9
Training, meetings and Committees 0.5
Total 60
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Figure 19: Organisational chart (31.12.2017)
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10. Communication
DON’T BRUSH FRAUD UNDER THE CARPET
In its dual capacity as independent investigative body 
that also acts as a Directorate-General of the European 
Commission in developing anti-fraud policies, OLAF 
strives to be as open and as transparent as possible 
with the media and the public, while safeguarding the 
confidentiality of its investigations. In recent years, 
OLAF has placed great emphasis on helping its audience 
understand the contribution it brings to the protection 
of the EU budget and to the European project as a whole. 
Given its independent investigative mandate, OLAF 
has its own Spokesperson’s team who liaise directly 
with media on matters pertaining to the investigative 
process.
In 2017, OLAF focused on both increasing its communica-
tion output and diversifying the channels through which 
it reaches its audience. Communication actions were 
geared towards developing and maintaining a positive re-
lationship with journalists, in Brussels and beyond, with 
the end goal of informing the public on why enforcing a 
policy of zero tolerance to fraud is essential. OLAF or-
ganised or participated in several press conferences and 
events, on issues ranging from the launch of the OLAF 
Annual Report, to customs fraud or cigarette smuggling. 
It partnered with national law enforcement institutions 
in order to present cross-European case studies, for ex-
ample supporting the Latvian Ministry of Finance in its 
“Fraud off!” campaign, or co-organising a press event 
with Belgian Customs when a new airplane scanner, fi-
nanced with EU funds, was innaugurated at Zaventem 
Airport. OLAF management and experts gave a series of 
interviews throughout the year, seeking to raise aware-
ness of the importance of the fight against fraud. 
In 2017, OLAF has also continued to be active on Twitter. 
This has helped the Office get closer to its audience, 
as well as engage with partner anti-fraud services, 
showcasing their work and achievements. OLAF ran 
several twitter campaigns, like the “515 campaign” on 
presenting new tools facilitated by OLAF for customs 
officials. Guest-posting exercises developed with OLAF 
partner institutions helped spread the word further about 
the need to take action against fraud and corruption. 
Throughout 2017, OLAF also continued to be the 
central point of the OAFCN - the OLAF Network of 
Anti-Fraud Communicators - which was created over a 
decade ago, and is a unique cross-European network of 
communication experts working on anti-fraud issues. The 
Network brings together Communication Officers and 
Spokespersons from OLAF’s operational partners in the 
Member States, such as customs authorities, police, law 
enforcement agencies, AFCOS and prosecutors’ offices. It 
plays a pivotal role in communicating the threat of fraud 
to the public across EU Member States, as well as the 
joint efforts made by national and European authorities 
to combat it. It is a key platform for raising awareness and 
reaching out to various audiences on fraud issues. 
OLAF also engaged in joint actions with other European 
Commission services, supporting the EU Budget Focused 
on Results initiative of the Directorate-General for 
Budget, as well as presenting its work at the yearly Open 
Day of the European Institutions.
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11.  Statistical annex: additional data  
on OLAF investigative activity
This annex presents additional detailed data relating to OLAF’s investigative activity in 2017, as a complement to the 
key indicators already mentioned in chapters 2 and 5. 
25 Since a new case management system was introduced at the end of 2016, the processing of new incoming information required more 
time. This explains why the average duration of selections has increased to 2.4 months in 2017. It is expected that the average duration 
of selections will decrease. 
Figure 20: OLAF’s investigative performance
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Incoming information 959 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136 1293
Investigations opened 160 152 146 431 253 234 219 219 215
Investigations concluded 140 136 154 266 293 250 304 272 197
Recommendations issued 194 172 175 199 353 397 364 346 309
Figure 21: Selections completed and their duration25
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Selections completed 1007 886 926 1770 1247 1353 1442 1157 1111
Average duration (in months) of selection phase 5.8 6.3 6.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.4
Figure 22: Average duration of closed and ongoing investigations (in months)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average duration of investigation 20.2 20.8 22.4 17.3 17.5 18.1 18.7 17.2 15.8
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
5.7 6.4 6.9 6.3 4.3 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.8
Total average duration of cases 25.9 27.2 29.3 23.6 21.8 21.0 21.0 18.9 17.6
Figure 23: Average duration of closed investigations only (in months) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Average duration of investigation 25.8 22.9 27.0 22.5 22.3 23.3 25.1 23.2 21.9
Average duration of selection 
corresponding to these cases
5.6 5.6 6.1 7.5 5.9 3.6 2.8 1.8 1.7
Total average duration of cases 31.4 28.5 33.1 30.0 28.2 26.9 27.9 25.0 23.6
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Figure 25: Recommendations issued
Type of recommendation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Financial 76 62 63 116 233 253 220 209 195
Judicial 61 67 73 54 85 101 98 87 80
Disciplinary 18 10 16 25 24 15 16 18 10
Administrative 39 33 23 4 11 28 30 32 24
Total 194 172 175 199 353 397 364 346 309
Figure 26: Incoming information by source
Source 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
PRIVATE 523 594 767 889 889 959 933 756 889
PUBLIC 436 381 274 375 405 458 439 380 404
Total 959 975 1041 1264 1294 1417 1372 1136 1293
Figure 24: Percentage of ongoing investigations lasting more than 20 months
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
37% 41% 38% 22% 30% 30% 22% 20% 22%
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Figure 27: Incoming information from Member States in 2017
Member State Public source Private source Total
Austria 0 1 1
Belgium 12 4 16
Bulgaria 7 20 27
Croatia 1 11 12
Cyprus 0 0 0
Czech Republic 2 13 15
Denmark 1 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
France 5 6 11
Germany 4 6 10
Greece 2 11 13
Hungary 1 26 27
Ireland 0 2 2
Italy 7 12 19
Latvia 0 0 0
Lithuania 1 3 4
Luxembourg 0 0 0
Malta 1 0 1
Netherlands 4 0 4
Poland 1 18 19
Portugal 1 1 2
Romania 7 17 24
Slovakia 1 8 9
Slovenia 0 2 2
Spain 12 19 31
Sweden 0 3 3
United Kingdom 4 5 9
Total 74 188 262
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of 
Europe Direct Information Centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/
contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions 
about the European Union. You can contact this service 
– by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators 
may charge for these calls), 
– at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or 
– by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU 
is available on the Europa website at: http://europa.eu  
EU Publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU 
Bookshop at: http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free 
publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local 
information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact)
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 
in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.
eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides 
access to datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for 
free, both for commercial and non-commercial purposes.
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